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This issue, edited by LACC Director of Research and Colombian Studies Institute Director, Ana Maria
Bidegain, presents today’s Latin American and Caribbean religious landscape through different lenses:
country profiles (Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia); sub-regional monographs (River Plate and the Caribbean);
vignettes on the evolution of particular religious denominations (Christian, Islamic, and Judaic), communities
(indige- nous Pentecostals) and practices (New World African religion). The feature article, authored by
leading US expert on Latin American religion, Daniel Levine, examines the relationship between religion and
politics in the region after thirty years of democratic rule. Different perspectives are represented: from the
North and South of the Americas, as well as Europe.
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Dear Hemisphere readers:
It is with great pride that I write you this letter. Such a great issue warrants immodesty; our guest editors Ana María
Bidegain and Juan Sánchez have done a magnificent job putting together this volume on Religion in Latin America and I
thank them for their effort, hard work, and commitment. I am pleased to have the opportunity to follow in the footsteps
of Mark Rosenberg and Eduardo Gamarra, both distinguished scholars and accomplished academicians, as well as my
predecessors as editors of Hemisphere and directors of the Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida
International University.
Latin American and Caribbean religious landscapes have dramatically changed over the last twenty years, becoming
more diverse by the day. In the span of one generation, Latin Americans, who used to be identified as mainly Roman
Catholic, have rediscovered the religious practices of their indigenous and African ancestors and have also converted in
droves to Protestantism while joining evangelical churches at record pace. Given the current rate of conversions, countries
such as Guatemala and even Brazil, which was considered the world’s largest Catholic country in 1970, will be mainly
protestant by 2020. Jewish communities have had a unique and significant socio-economic and historical presence in
many parts of the region, while Muslim communities constitute important segments of the populations in former British
colonies in the Caribbean. Islamic populations, although relatively small have increased due to migration from the
Middle East and growing rates of conversion throughout Latin America.
Increased numbers of those taking a “do-it-yourself” approach to Catholicism, agnostics, and atheists have caused a
spike in the numbers of self-identifying non-religious individuals and the secularization of Latin America has had a perceivable impact on Latin American society. The year in Latin America is no longer defined by religious holidays.
Although Semana Santa continues to be “sacred” in most countries, Mexican and Central American middle classes tend
to celebrate the religious holiday by vacationing at beaches and preparing traditional dishes, rather than piously observing
the holiday and attending church services. Not unlike for the rest of the world, Christmas in the Southern Cone evokes
shopping and enjoying leisurely warm evenings while dining and socializing outdoors.
In this issue, the editors succinctly present today’s Latin American and Caribbean religious landscape through different
lenses: country profiles (Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia); sub-regional monographs (River Plate and the Caribbean);
vignettes on the evolution of particular religious denominations (Christian, Islamic, and Judaic), communities (indigenous Pentecostals) and practices (New World African religion). The feature article, authored by one of the leading US
experts on Latin American religion, Daniel Levine, examines the relationship between religion and politics in the region
after thirty years of democratic rule. Different perspectives are represented: from the North and South of the Americas, as
well as Europe and established and burgeoning scholars alike have shared their research and perspectives.
The panoramic tableau provided by this volume is very broad for obvious reasons and is intended to invite readers to
learn more about a phenomenon that profoundly impacts all people throughout the region and the diaspora, regardless of
individual beliefs. I encourage readers to further explore other scholarly works on Latin American religion by the contributors and welcome them to cross disciplines, country boundaries, and communities in an attempt to more completely
understand the complexity of religion in present-day Latin America and the Caribbean.
As with everything at LACC, this publication of Hemisphere was truly a team effort. I would like to thank my colleagues and Hemisphere Associate Editors, Liesl Picard, Pedro Botta, and Alisa Newman for their valuable contributions
related to the translating, copyediting, formatting, and all of the additional little and not-so-little things involved in publishing. I have already thanked Ana María Bidegain and Juan Sánchez for their superb job; allow me to commend them
on their excellent work once again.
Finally, I would like to thank all the Hemisphere readers who, during the past year hiatus of the magazine, repeatedly
came to us requesting another issue of the magazine and to John Stack, the director of the FIU School for International
and Public Affairs, who gave us the green light to resume the publication, as we continue to provide insightful research
and commentary on contemporary issues in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Thank you,
Cristina Eguizábal, Ph.D.
Director, Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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Religion in Latin America
By Ana María Bidegain and Juan Jennis Sánchez Soler
he religious field, with
its multifarious interrelations with the social,
cultural, economic and
political fabric, is indeed
a privileged locus for exploring the
contemporary Latin American
process. Particularly pressing in this
issue of Hemisphere are questions
pertaining to the place of religions
within still-in-the-making non-confessional states, within democracy,
and vis-à-vis the official recognition
of pluralism and religious freedom.
Far from surveying the subject matter exhaustively, the reports and
analyses included simply underscore
the inherent complexity, dynamism,
plurality, vastness and contemporary
relevance of religions in Latin
America. They feature historical and
ethnographic sketches, up-to-date
quantitative data, descriptions of current trends and future projections.
The contributors live and work in
different Latin American countries,
as well as in the US and Europe, and
represent different academic disciplines and areas of specialty. Some of
the texts were written originally in
English, while others were translated
from Spanish, Portuguese and
French. The contributors inform us
about the rapid re-composition now
undergoing Southern religious fields,
while they present us with cases that
problematize many commonly held
misconceptions, and no longer operant academic taxonomies. Religious
identities and their respective roles
within the polis are thus shown to
behave like complex, mutating, and
hardly predictable processes rather
than like natural or fixed essences.
Treating the region as a whole
under the heading of religion is not
the same as averaging out or blend-

T

ing together its distinct localized realities. No homogenous Latin
American whole emerges from the
addition of its disparate parts.
Simplistically correlating the multiple patches of religious diversity with
compartments such as particular
nation-states, territories, ethnic
groups, races, social classes, genders,
ideological persuasions and confessions would falsify the messiness that
we often encounter in the field,
where an indigenous group may
simultaneously advocate for the official recognition of its ancestral cultural traits and militate as Pentecostal
believers… where many white
Cubans now seek initiation within
Santeria and other African Diaspora
religions. Furthermore, communities
from Latin America have brought
their religions and cultures beyond
borders with massive migration and
widespread transnational practices.
Bi-dimensional technologies of representation such as maps need to be
extremely nuanced to provide credible information. Or rather, no single
religious map can anymore convey a
reality that we recognize as multidimensional and shifting. The cultural, political, economic, religious
and geopolitical maps of Latin
America are simply not coextensive.
History and culture in Latin
America defy the all-too-neat binary
Western vs. Non-Western civilization. The region is not intelligible
unless one sees how it has been historically constituted, over the past
five centuries, by centrally defining
features of European cultures as well
as by defining traits stemming from
countless Amerindian and African
original cultures. The historical confrontation between the tri-continental forces in the region is complex to

the point of eluding any single
descriptive pattern. In this respect,
there are radical differences both
between countries and within countries, with distinct cases of both cultural conjunction and disjunction.
Cuban Santería presents us with a
classic case of African-European
conjunction, while Buenos Aires
and Montevideo reproduce largely
European lifestyles and multiple
Amazonian peoples still represent
almost pure forms of PreColumbian life. Many lines of
memory and identity traits converge, diverge, struggle, run parallel,
clash and merge within Latin
America’s cultural substratum. That
is why in the same historical epoch
we can identify contrasting phenomena that in other parts of the
world emerge as more homogeneous and unidirectional processes.
Today, broad social and cultural segments of Latin America follow
trends akin to European counterparts (urban secularization), others
resemble trends in other parts of the
global South (the Christian
Charismatic and Pentecostal explosion, and its institutionalization in
independent churches), and yet
other phenomena resonate with
analogous processes in the US
(activism regarding the national
recognition of distinct indigenous
and African cultural identities).
In part, today’s multiplication of
religious trends in Latin America
stem from a historical de jure situation of religious uniformity that
never managed to become de facto.
All the studies in this issue coincide
in their assessments regarding the
definite end of Christendom-type
Catholic hegemony as a definite
mark of the religious horizon of the
Hemisphere Volume 19
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region, for now and for the foreseeable future. Their observations imply
that hegemonic Christendom has
been fractured: 1) From the outside,
by the visibility of exogenous traditions, extraneous to the construed
colonial homogeneity (Jewish presence, studied here by Damián Setton
and Muslim presence, by María del
Mar Logroño Narbona); 2) from the
deep within, by the vindication of
ancestral religious systems of
Amerindians and African
Descendents, historically made
endogenous through the culturalreligious negotiations of these traditions and Catholic homogeneity
(Terry Rey, Pablo Wright, and
Laennec Hurbon); 3) from the institutional consolidation, acculturation
and coming of age of Historical
Protestantism (Presbyterians,
Episcopalians, Mennonites, etc.) in
the different countries of the region;
4) from the increasing visibility of
minority New Religious Movements
such as Hare Krishna, and the different manifestations of interest on
New Age literature and rituals, and
“spiritual but not religious” proposals; 5) from the emergence of centers
associated with ancient world religions, such as centers of Zen
Buddhism (more common in large
metropolitan areas such as Buenos
Aires and Sao Paulo, and prevalent
above all among the educated and
affluent strata of society); 6) from the
explosion of Pentecostal and NeoPentecostal groups; 7) from the
internal polarization of divergent ideological trends within the Catholic
Church and a growing number of
de-institutionalized Catholics
(Mallimaci’s católico a mi manera);
8) and finally, from an increasingly
noticeable segment of citizens who
define themselves as non-religious
(post-Christian secularists, agnostics
and atheists and never evangelized
persons). The end of the Catholic
Church’s uncontested homogeny in
6
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the religious field is, therefore, one of
the most crucial processes at work in
the region, against the backdrop of a
centenary tradition of Church-state
symbiosis, refurbished in several
countries throughout their republican history.
The cases presented in this issue
indicate that we must be cautious
with assertions to the effect that a
future Christendom is emerging
from the South. Applied to Latin
America, such a prediction is questionable. Author Philip Jenkins
explains that the next Christendom
is gaining momentum now under
the aegis of the rapidly expanding
Charismatic and Pentecostal
Christianity throughout the global
South. However, in the context of
Latin America, the most tangible
result of Pentecostal growth has been
a more conspicuous assertion of the
region’s religious diversity. This
effect, in turn, deepens the fracture
of any Christendom whatsoever. In
their respective articles, Daniel
Levine and Fortunato Mallimaci
explore the implications of a religiously plural society for the consolidation of democracy. However, a reasonable concern about the consistency with democracy of many present
day Southern grass-roots religious
movements is their characteristic
anti-modern outlook. This is manifested in terms of excessive supernaturalism, biblical fundamentalism,
and theological and moral ultraconservatism. The political awakening of
Pentecostals will likely imply a
stronger concerted lobby of religious
groups to push for conservative
moral and religious agendas affecting
the general public, as is the case with
issues of sexual morality, contraception, and the definition of marriage.
These agendas would be advanced
through regular legislative processes,
in which case the religious activists
and their followers would formally
participate as citizens. In fact, many

of the newer Neopentecostal churches have behaved very assertively in
this regard, leaving in the past the
traditional political quietism associated with these denominations, defining their political platforms, seeking
ideological allies in the larger political space, forming their own political
parties and succeeding in getting
their candidates elected. These features place Pentecostals away from
the emancipation promises of
modernity, in contrast to the positions embraced by the Protestant
World Council of Churches and by
the Vatican Council II. On the
other hand, many historical subjects
traditionally marginal to the body
politic have been empowered via
new religious affiliation, and are
now conscious of their potential
for leadership, especially poor and
undereducated charismatic women.
As Catholic ecclesial base communities (CEBs), Pentecostal churches
create a space for participation and
discourse for persons otherwise
marginalized from national life and
citizenry. For now, the question of
how much and in what precise sense
the Pentecostal phenomenon will
impact Latin American reality
remains undecidable.
The authors in this issue tend to
focus mainly on the political impact
of the numerical growth of
Pentecostalism; that is, the contribution of this growth to the legal definition of Latin American societies as
religiously plural and to the deeper
secularization of the state. As the
question stands now, it is risky to
make predictions, especially in light
of the rapidly mutating nature of
small churches, which now behave as
sects (in the sociological, Weberian
sense), but may soon age into more
mainstream denominations.
Furthermore, despite its tremendous
growth, Pentecostalism remains a
regional religious minority. We must
also take into account these accom-
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panying facts: Amerindian and Afro
revival movements are also emerging
as important players in the religious,
social and political fields; within the
historical churches, especially within
Catholicism, consciousness of internal diversity has heightened, as contrasting ideological and theological
trends come to sharp-relive (Da
Costa even suggests the advantage of
the plural term “Catholicisms”), and
therefore a position of hegemony or
privilege would necessarily affect a
portion of the faithful negatively;
finally, the numbers of secular and
non-religious citizens are increasing
as well.
The official recognition of the
multi-religious character of the
nations seems to generate centrifugal
and centripetal forces causing internal revitalization within the religions
as well as interesting patterns of
interaction between them. Some
authors, such as Andrew Chesnut ,
analyze this aspect through the analogy of religious markets competing
for members. Hurbon illustrates this
phenomenon for the Caribbean case,
where African Diaspora expressions
have become more visible and
accepted out of a process of assertion
vis-à-vis the institutionalization of
minority evangelical groups. By contrast, Terry Rey and Ricardo
Mariano show that Evangelical
growth has decimated African religions in Haiti and Brazil respectively.
An analogous pattern happens
among Amerindians (Wright). An
underlying hypothesis is that, just as
in prior ages ancestral indigenous
and African systems found affinities
with symbolic, narrative, ritual and
plastic components of Iberian
Catholicism, today those affinities
are being transferred to performative
components of Pentecostal praxis
(Spirit possession and faith healing).
The boundaries of Latin America
are elusive, and become more fluid
in the Caribbean and into the terri-

torial US. Thus, Laennec Hurbon’s
text reports not only on religious
developments within the “Latin”
portion of the insular Caribbean
basin, but also within the
Anglophone territory. The shared
postcolonial situations of these
islanders and Latin America at large
sustain cultural and historical links
that go beyond the criterion of a
macro-linguistic community.
Likewise, the sheer number of people
of Latin American stock living in the
US constitutes today a decisive historical force. Trespassing into the
Northern half of the half-sphere,
Gastón Espinosa presents quantitative evidence regarding both the
importance of the Hispanic electorate in US politics, and the importance of religion informing their
political options. However, Hispanic
comportment during the 2008 elections indicates that they are represented across the American religious
and political spectrums, and no obvious correlation exists between their
denominational affiliation and their
partisan political leanings.
Finally, we need to take into
account that a project such as the
one undertaken for this issue
demands a mature analysis of data
and sound conceptual frameworks.
Nevertheless, the changes in the
religious and political fields in the
region are so rapid, that our analysis of the contemporary, requiring
some decantation of lived reality
into workable categories, some prudent distance from sources and
phenomena, tends to be referred to
the recent past rather than to the
immediate present. The accumulation of facts corresponding to the
latest developments runs parallel to
the tracking of observations and the
devising of newer models of interpretation by scholars in the relevant
fields. However, meaningful assessments of the church-state issues visà-vis the latest political re-configu-

ration of the continent are not
mature yet. Nevertheless, the main
processes and trends charted in this
issue of Hemisphere, such as the
expansion of a plural religious field
and its recognition by the state, are
not likely to be reversed by drastic
changes in the political field in the
foreseeable future. n
1

Chesnut, Andrew. Competitive Spirits: Latin
America’s New Religious Economy. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003.

Ana María Bidegain is an associate
professor in the Department of
Religious Studies at FIU and director
of the Colombian Studies Institute in
the University’s Latin American and
Caribbean Center.
Juan Jennis Sánchez Soler is a graduate of FIU’s Master of Arts Program
in Religious Studies.
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Religious Transformation in Brazil
By Ricardo Mariano; Translated by Alisa Newman

rom 1500 to 1822 Brazil
was under the colonial
domination of Portugal,
which, like Spain, imposed
and propagated
Catholicism in the lands it conquered in the “New World.” With
independence and the foundation of
empire in 1882, Brazil adopted
Catholicism as its state religion and,
under the system of padroado (imperial patronage), defended the institution against the entry and expansion
of other faiths, allowing it to maintain a near monopoly on religious
life. The advent of the Republic in
1889 led to the legal separation of
church and state, but left the
Catholic Church many privileges and
allowed for state discrimination
against other religious groups, which
in any case represented a tiny minority of the population. Although the
clergy opposed the separation, in
practice it freed the church from state
tutelage, allowing it to become closer
to the Vatican, discipline and moralize its ranks, repress liberal clergy,
rein in popular Catholicism, recruit
and train new clergy, and expand its

F

infrastructure and network of seminaries, parishes, dioceses and schools.
In sum, the separation strengthened
the church as a religious institution,
as well as its political power.
For most of the twentieth century,
the Brazilian religious landscape
remained dominated by Catholicism,
with very little religious diversity.
Until 1970, according to census data
(Table 1), the world’s largest Catholic
country was 91.1% Catholic,
accounting for a total of 85.8 million
people. Thirty years later, this majority had fallen to 73.8%, with the
largest declines in urban and developed areas, which tended toward secularization. Thanks to overall demographic growth, however, Catholics
still accounted for 125.5 million of
Brazil’s total population of 170 million, almost 100 million more than
Evangelical sects.
Evangelical movements (Reformist
Protestant, Adventist and Pentecostal
denominations), Afro-Brazilian religions (Candomblé and Umbanda)
and Kardecism (a form of Spiritism
based on the writings of France’s
Allan Kardec) began to gain follow-

Table 1 – Brazilian Religions from 1940 to 2000, by Percentage of Population
Religion
Catholics
Evangelicals
Other
Religions
No religion
Total (*)

1940
95.2
2.6

1950
93.7
3.4

1960
93.1
4.0

1970
91.1
5.2

1980
89.2
6.6

1991
83.3
9

2000
73.8
15.4

1.9
0.2
100.0

2.4
0.5
100.0

2.4
0.5
100.0

2.3
0.8
100.0

2.5
1.6
100.0

2.9
4.8
100.0

3.5
7.3
100.0

(*) Does not include undeclared or undetermined religions.
SOURCE: IBGE, demographic census data
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ers and visibility in the second half of
the twentieth century, but it wasn’t
until the 1980s, in the context of
urbanization, industrialization, cultural modernization and a return to
democracy, that the numbers of
Evangelicals—especially Pentecostals
—and those professing no religion
began to grow rapidly.
In 1970, 4,833,106 Brazilians
(5.2% of the population) were
Evangelical. This number rose to
7,885,650 (6.6%) by 1980,
13,157,094 (9%) in 1991 and
26,452,174 (15.6%) in 2000.
Pentecostals were the main group
responsible for this extraordinary
expansion. Protestant denominations, with the exception of the
Baptist and Adventist churches,
recorded little growth in this period.
From 1980 to 2000 Pentecostals
doubled in number every decade,
from 3.9 million in 1980 to 8.8 million in 1991 and 17.7 million in
2000, accounting for almost 80% of
all Evangelicals. Five Pentecostal
denominations made up 85% of the
total; by far the largest was the
Assembly of God, whose 8,418,154
congregants in 2000 made it the
largest Pentecostal church in the
world and represented almost half
(47.5%) of the members of this
faith. In the same period,
Pentecostals gained increased visibility, social legitimacy and enormous
spaces on radio and TV, entered
political parties, broadened their
political power and changed the
nation’s landscape with their temples
and congregations. They became a
powerful religious minority, proselytizing aggressively and increasingly
active in politics.

Reports

Brazilian Evangelist Christians pray during a ritual group baptism.
Photo: Menahem Kahana/AFP/Getty Images.

The fastest growing religious
movement in Brazil and the rest of
Latin America, Pentecostalism has its
base in poverty and urban centers, at
the bottom of the socioeconomic
pyramid. Its followers tend to have
little education and earn the minimum wage (465 reais, or US$230 a
month) in jobs as domestic help or
other unstable occupations. It
attracts more women than men and
more black, mixed race and indigenous people than whites. With rare
exceptions, the middle classes shun
Pentecostalism, whether out of moral
conservatism or sectarianism.
Until 1970 people with no religion
—those claiming to have no religious
affiliation—were a tiny group
(0.8%). Their numbers jumped to 2
million in 1980, 7 million in 1991
and 12.5 million in 2000, at which

point they represented 7.3% of the
population. This enormous growth
is a strong indicator of the trend
toward secularization and is concentrated mostly in urban areas and
among young adult males.
In contrast, Afro-Brazilian religions
declined sharply over the last few
decades. The percentage of
Brazilians professing these religions
fell from 0.6% in 1980 to 0.4% in
1991 and 0.3% in 2000 (for a total
of 571,329 followers), a loss of
101,000 followers in 20 years. From
1991 to 2000 Umbanda, a syncretic
religion born in the 1920s in Rio de
Janeiro and influenced to varying
degrees by Candomblé, Catholicism,
Pajelança (Afro-Amerindian beliefs)
and Kardecism, also lost more than
100,000 adherents, falling from
541,518 to 432,001 members.

Candomblé—a polytheistic religion
brought to Brazil by African slaves
with cults organized around African
gods and goddesses (orixás) and welcoming members from all ethnic
groups—grew from 106,957 to
139,329 faithful in the same decade
but still represented only 0.08% of
the population.
Both the tiny demographic share
of Afro-Brazilian religions (0.3% in
total) and the decline of Umbanda
are surprising. Until very recently
North American Protestant missionaries and Brazilian pastors described
a Brazil dominated by Spiritism and
African sorcery. Social scientists discoursed solemnly on the continuing
expansion of these cults. By 2000,
however, there were only about half
as many people practicing African
religions in Brazil as there were
Jehova’s Witnesses. Several factors
explain this decline, not least of
which is the fact that African-based
religions are demonized and targeted
for proselytism by the country’s rapidly growing Pentecostal churches.
Added to this is their lack of power
in political or media circles, their
dispersal in a myriad of small
groups, the absence of an organizational structure for collective representation and the continued social
stigma of their identification with
black sorcery.
In 2000 Brazil remained overwhelmingly Christian, with 89.2%
of the population Catholic or
Evangelical. Christians and the nonreligious accounted for 96.5% of all
Brazilians, leaving only 3.5% affiliated with other religions. In the entire
country there were only 18,559
Muslims, 2,979 Hindus, 101,062
Jews, 67,288 Esoterics and 10,723
followers of indigenous traditions.
The largest groups were Spiritists
(2,337,432), Afro-Brazilian religions
(571,329), Jehova’s Witnesses
(1,104,879) and Mormons
(199,641). Small and little-known
Hemisphere Volume 19
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groups such as Santo Daime, born in
the Amazon region in the early twentieth century and making ritual use
of the hallucinogenic drink ayahuasca, fell into the category of “other
religiosities.” An important caveat,
however, is the limitations of quantitative data for understanding religious dynamics and diversity. Tens
of millions of Catholics, for example,
practice their own religion infrequently and turn to others for cures
or solutions to their daily problems.
The most recent quantitative data
on religion in Brazil was compiled
by the Datafolha Institute in 2007
based on a broad survey of
Brazilians over the age of 16. It
found a country that is 64%
Catholic (56% in the state capitals), 22% Evangelical (17%
Pentecostal and 5% Protestant) and
7% non-religious. With the exception of the non-religious, whose
percentage remained about the
same, these numbers reflect the
main trends of the preceding two
decades: the strong decline in
Catholicism and rapid growth of
Pentecostalism. Other religious
groups accounted for 7% of the
population. Of its 190 million
inhabitants, therefore, Brazil has
close to 121 million Catholics and
more than 40 million Evangelicals,
of whom almost 30 million are
Pentecostal, giving it the largest
number of Pentecostals of any
country in the world.
During the papacies of John Paul
II and Benedict XVI, the Brazilian
Catholic Church has been in sharp
decline. At the same time, however,
it has become more diverse, created
new communities, encouraged the
Charismatic Renewal movement to
compete with Pentecostalism, stem
the loss of congregants and adapt to
the popular demand for more
dynamic clergy and rituals, and
become more conservative morally,
politically, theologically and ecclesias10
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tically. Despite the repression of
Liberation Theology, the church has
also encouraged its clergy to be active
in social movements, defend human
rights and work toward the social
inclusion of the poor.
Acknowledging new social and
religious realities, it has abandoned
its old pretensions to national identity without submitting entirely to
the new sociocultural context: The
church continues to battle ongoing
trends toward cultural relativism,
individualism and hedonism—in
vain, in light of the growing pluralization of identities, the multiplication of social affiliations and the
increasing autonomy of individuals
from religious authorities, especially
with regard to morality and
sexual behavior.
In the last third of the twentieth
century, in a context of high unemployment and the growth of the
informal economy, social inequality,

an explosion of criminality and violence, the decline of traditional religion, and the rapid spread of
Pentecostalism and religious pluralism
to create a competitive market for religion, the link between national identity and Catholicism has been broken.
Political leaders now find themselves
obliged to consider the interests and
demands of other religious groups,
especially Evangelicals. n
Ricardo Mariano holds a doctorate in
sociology from the University of São
Paulo. He is a professor in the PostGraduate Social Sciences Program at
the Pontifical Catholic University of
Rio Grande do Sul, a researcher at the
National Council of Technological
and Scientific Development, and
author of the book Neopentecostais:
sociologia do novo pentecostalismo
no Brasil.
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Religious Diversity in Colombia
By Sandra Ríos
n 1991, Colombia’s new constitution established the lay character of the state, spurring a
reconfiguration of a religious
landscape previously monopolized by the Catholic Church.
Catholic hegemony—interrupted by
the first Church—State separation
attempt (1854) by Liberals- was legitimized with the establishment in
1886 of a centralized, conservative
and Catholic state and an 1887
Concordat with the Vatican. Furthermore, in 1902 the country was consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus.
Colombia’s religious landscape has
never been static, however; it has
always been dynamic, with periodic
struggles among different trends, positions, practices and beliefs, all in the
context of a history characterized by
violent socio-political conflict.
Present-day Colombia is not very different from most other Latin American countries in terms of religion: It
has a Catholic majority, a growing
Pentecostal population, approximately
100,000 Muslims, a small Jewish
community, and an indigenous population that accounts for 1.5% of the
total population, while Afro-descendents make up 20%.

I

A History of Violence
During the period of Liberal radicalism, Presbyterians were called
from England to breakdown the
Catholic hegemony. By the end of
the nineteenth century, Colombia
was home to a number of Christian
churches and even some Protestant
missions. Initial Protestant missionary efforts were not widely successful
and in some areas there was no clear
distinction between Protestants and
Catholics, due to poor Catholic cate-

A Colombian soldier holds a placard which reads ‘XII - Jesus Dies on the Cross,’ indicating the
12th station of the Cross, during the Good Friday procession along the streets of Bogotá. Photo:
Rodrigo Arangua/AFP/Getty Images.

chization; indeed, Protestants were
sometimes called “Catholics with
Bible.” In the twentieth century, they
gained some influence through the
creation of schools, temples and societies, but they did not attract a wide
following and remained a minority.
They drew the most attention for
their identification with Liberal
ideas, resulting in persecution by
conservatives. Expressions like the
one coined by Felix Sardà i Salvany
in Spain in 1884 and in Colombia
by San Ezequiel Moreno (18481906)—“El liberalismo es pecado”
(Liberalism is a sin) were widely popularized. Moreno went even further,
proclaiming: “to kill Liberals is not a
sin.” Pope John Paul II canonized
Moreno in 1992.
As Gonzalo Sánchez, director of
the Commission for Historical
Memory in Colombia, has noted, in
Colombia “war often makes people
live politics as a religious war, and to
live religion as politics.” This tendency to demonize the other was at its
height during the period of La

Violencia, in the 1950s. During this
war or series of small regional wars,
membership in one of the parties in
the dispute was mostly defined in
terms of place and heritage. The
political discourse was unclear but
religion served to identify the enemy.
In this way, the confrontation
between Liberals and Conservatives
masked a hidden religious agenda.
Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, conservative pan-Hispanist
Catholic factions had identified
Protestants with American imperialism, and President Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla linked them with Communism. All in all, the confrontation
led to anywhere between 116 and
1216 murders directly related to religious reasons. As late as the 1960s
and 70s some Colombian social scientist were still branding Protestants
as imperialists.
Growing Religious Diversity
In contrast to Protestants, who
often did not differentiate themselves
strongly from Catholics, Pentecostal
Hemisphere Volume 19
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converts adopted their new identity
at least in part in opposition to
Catholicism. Along Colombia’s
northern coast and in the main cities,
Pentecostalism grew out of foreign
missions but soon adapted to the
local culture as local leaders appeared
and split to form their own churches.
Initially, Pentecostals were politically
apathetic, regarding authority as
coming from God and politics as part
of the mundane sphere. Many of
them were committed to a millenarian discourse, which distanced them
even more from politics. In
Colombia’s armed conflict (in its
most simple terms, between leftist
guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries), this position won them favor
in the eyes of the paramilitaries, who
had carried out a “cleansing” of ecclesial base communities.
Under the new constitution,
Pentecostal groups have gained more
visibility in the public arena. They
have launched four political parties
and a range of associations and have
even signed agreements with the government (“small concordats”) granting them recognition and some benefits. Currently, approximately 7% of
Colombia’s population is Pentecostal.
In some municipalities in the
“banana axis” (Chigorodó, Apartadó,
Turbo and Necoclí), they are the
majority. As is the case in Brazil,
Evangelical political participation in
Colombia is mostly mainstream,
emphasizing the same traditional values of family and morality as the
most conservative trends of the
Catholic Church.
Of course, the Catholic Church
too is hardly a static or monolithic
institution. The development of different trends within Catholicism has
responded to concrete historical circumstances. One the one hand, in
the 1960s and 70s some elements of
the Church were close to a dialogue
with the political left. Catholics then
were influenced by Vatican Council
12
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II and the Episcopal Conference at
Medellín and their discourse focused
on the needs of the people.
Important figures included the group
of priests of La Golconda, the SAL
group and CINEP, and Catholic
clergy such as Father Camilo Torres
and Bishop Gerardo Valencia Cano
adopted the perspective of Liberation
Theology. (Protestants had a similar
movement, La Rosca group formed
by Orlando Fals Borda and Augusto
Libreros, among others.) The next
decade saw the consolidation of a
strong Conservative trend focused on
rebuilding the moral order and promoting spiritual movements such as
the Charismatic Catholic Renewal as
well as the Pentecostal Movement.
Religious Symbols in Peacemaking
During the second half of the
1980s, the Catholic hierarchy
changed its position toward the
armed conflict and became a strong
defender of human rights. At the
hierarchical level, ecclesiastical peacemaking efforts consist of attempts to
promote dialogue at the national
level, while at the local level pastoral
organizations work with victims of
the violence. Catholics also cooperate in ecumenical initiatives for peace
alongside Mennonites, other historical Protestants and selected groups of
Pentecostals. Unfortunately, the
human cost for churches of peacemaking has been high; among
Catholics, one archbishop, three
bishops, more than 50 priests, nine
religious men, two missionaries,
three religious women and many lay
members of the church have been
killed in the last 10 years. Many
more have been kidnapped and
threatened. The situation is no better for Protestants; in the same period, more than 50 pastors have been
killed and many others kidnapped.
According to the Vatican news
agency, Colombia has the highest
rate of religious murder in the world.

Beyond the work of religious institutions in peacemaking attempts, religion has influenced victims’ interpretations of their experiences, as well as
how the conflict is understood. For
instance, Colombia’s national branding campaign, “Marca Pasión,” is
symbolized by the Sacred Heart. The
deliberate use of this image draws on
a principle of unity based on a religious idea, and it is controversial
because of the violent story behind
the figure of the bleeding heart of
Jesus. The icon represents silent resignation before a painful fate that
finds redemption in the suffering
heart of Jesus, and through its
resigned acceptance of tragedy it
helps to normalize the reception of
violence. This kind of symbolic use
of religious referents is often well
received by the public, as the popularity of President Uribe demonstrates. Uribe has mined a rich symbolic capital for his charismatic political appeal based on exhibitionist religious practices and alliances with
conservative religious institutions.
Rodolfo de Roux has argued that
religion can become unconscious in
a secular society in which elements
of religious language are reproduced
even if their religious content has
been emptied. Values such as
orthodoxy, demonization of the
adversary, surrogate victim or scapegoat, dogmatism and blind obedience
to authority appear frequently in
daily public discourse in Colombia,
as does the magic ritual of language
that makes tragic realities disappear.
On a positive note, the enduring
power of religious language and symbols underlines the importance of the
work that religious and pastoral
organizations, and all religious traditions in Colombia, can do to transform old discourses of intolerance. n
Sandra Ríos is a graduate of Florida
International University’s Master of
Arts Program in Religious Studies.
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Mexico: Religious Tensions in
Latin America’s First Secular State
By Carlos Garma
eligion has traditionally
been a source of conflict
in Mexican history.
Under the Royal
Agreement of 1501,
Pope Alexander VI and the Spanish
monarchy established Catholicism as
the only religion allowed in the
Americas. All other forms of belief
were prohibited, including Lutheran
“heresy,” Judaism and traditional
Native American practices. The
Catholic Church enjoyed great economic and social power during
Mexico’s colonial period and the
Virgin of Guadalupe emerged as an
important source of popular religious
fervor and national identity.
After the consolidation of Mexico’s
independence in 1821, however, ties
between the Vatican and the national
government were strained. In the
mid nineteenth century, Liberal anticlerical leaders fought against
Conservatives who supported the
Catholic Church. The Liberal victory culminated with the presidency of
Benito Juárez, an iconic figure in
Mexican history. Juárez separated
church and state in 1875, establishing the first lay or secular state in
Latin America and opening the door
to Protestant institutions. Later in
the century, the government of
Porfirio Díaz showed greater tolerance toward the Catholic Church,
but when the Mexican Revolution
began in 1910, the church was again
branded as a reactionary enemy seeking to impose a conservative order.
The Mexican constitution of 1917
codified a series of restrictions on the

R

Catholic Church and the practice of
religion in general. Religious institutions were accorded no legal or juridical recognition, churches could not
officially own property or run schools,
public religious ceremonies were outlawed, and priests and the members
of religious orders could not vote or
be involved in political activities.
Although these laws were difficult
to apply, they sparked a popular
revolt, the Cristero war, in the
1930s. The outcome was a modus
vivendi between church and state
that involved simulated application
of the laws by the government and
passive acceptance by religious
authorities. Amazingly, this arrangement remained in place until 1991,
when President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari sent the National Congress a
proposal to modify sections of the
constitution dealing with the official
attitude toward religion. The result
was the Law of Religious
Associations and Public Worship,
enacted in 1992.
Bringing the Church Back In
The new law placed all churches
under the category of religious associations (ARs). Currently, all ARs
must register with the Ministry of
the Interior to receive official recognition. To register, they must present
a list of all their clergy and assets, but
they are exempt from taxation.
Clergy still cannot hold political
positions or any post awarded by
popular election. ARs cannot own
mass media outlets, but they can rent
them. Mexico now has more than

6,000 registered ARs, almost 1,000
of which are linked to the Catholic
Church. (Different religious orders
and dioceses have their own records
and registers).
Implementation of the law has
not been simple. The resolution of
religious conflicts has required mediation by the state, and its role has
not always been objective. An example is the treatment of members of
dissident religious groups in rural
communities, the most notorious
case being the expulsion of 30,000
Protestants by the Catholic indigenous community of San Juan
Chamula in Chiapas. The persecution persisted for more than 20 years
due to the negligence of state authorities, who refused to get involved.
After the new law took effect in
1992 the military finally intervened
in the community. In 2000, the
election of an Evangelical governor,
Pablo Salazar Mendicuchia, brought
a definitive end to the conflict and
mediators were designated to help
resolve religious differences at the
community level.
Another problem was how to deal
with Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are
more than one million strong in
Mexico. The millenarian beliefs of
this creed prevent its members from
pledging allegiance to the national
flag, and as a result some students
were expelled from public schools.
The National Human Rights
Commission has condemned the
expulsions as acts of intolerance in
violation of the law and the number
of such incidents is on the decline.
Hemisphere Volume 19

13

Reports

The National Panorama
According to the 2000 census,
Mexico has a total population of
97,483,412 (individuals aged five
and older). Eighty-eight percent of
the population declares itself to be
Catholic, with Protestants and
Evangelicals accounting for 5.2%.
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and
Seventh Day Adventists, classified
under the vague term “nonEvangelical Biblical,” represent a further 2.1%. An additional 3.55% say
they have no religion, and the
remaining 1.15% fall into the categories of “other religions” or “not
specified.”
The numbers vary from region to
region, however. The most atypical
state is Chiapas, located on Mexico’s
southern border, where only 63% of
the population is Catholic, the lowest percentage in the country. An
additional 13.5% of the state’s residents are Protestant or Evangelical,
8.5% are Biblical non-Evangelicals,
and a surprising 13.5% are nonbelievers. Other southern states such
as Tabasco, Quintana Roo,
Campeche and Veracruz all have
lower percentages (about 80%) of
Catholics than the national rate and
double the percentage of Protestants
and Evangelicals (10.3 %). One
explanation for this trend is the higher rate of conversion to non-Catholic
denominations in indigenous communities, which are more prevalent
in Mexico’s south. In contrast, the
central-western states of
Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Guanajuato
and Zacatecas, with more urban,
Hispanic populations, are almost
totally Catholic. Mexico City, the
capital, more closely mirrors the
national average.
Religion and Politics
The uneasy relationship between
church and state continues in the
twenty-first century. The conservative government of President Vicente
14
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This 19th-century polychromed wooden statue of Christ—Cristo Calvario—is still used in religious
processions in the city of Guanajuato, Mexico.

Fox (2000-2006) challenged the lay
or secular tradition of Mexican politics by showing a clear affinity with
the Catholic Church. It made widespread use of Catholic symbols and
was obviously reluctant to mediate
in the resolution of religious conflicts. This tendency has continued
under the administration of current
President Felipe Calderón, also of
the conservative National Action
Party (PAN), but a reversal may be
in the works after victories by more
liberal politicians in the 2009
midterm elections.
Another controversy in which religion plays an important role is in the
debate on abortion. Mexico City’s
municipal government legalized
abortion in April 2007 with the support of the leftist PRD party, sparking heated discussion among churches, political parties and non-government groups. In January 2009, at
the International Conference on
Family sponsored by the Vatican,
President Calderón spoke in favor of
upholding traditional values.
Afterwards, 11 states passed local legislation that explicitly prohibits abor-

tion under all conditions.
Conservative sectors have approved
these measures as a way of curbing
the extremely liberal position of the
capital city.
Politics cannot hide the reality
that Mexico faces a future of
increasing religious diversity. To
meet this challenge, the country
must work to increase respect for
human rights and especially freedom of belief. Mexican churches
do not have a tradition of accepting
other creeds, and religious diversity
may bring with it competition
between different denominations.
Negotiation will be necessary to
resolve the conflicts that will
inevitably arise, calling for disinterested intervention on the part of
the state. Mexico’s government has
a responsibility to assume this role
as part of the process of bringing
the country into the future as a
plural and open society. n
Carlos Garma is a professor of
anthropology at the Universidad
Autónoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa
in Mexico City.
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Religion in Motion in
Río de la Plata
By Néstor Da Costa; Translated by Alisa Newman
rgentina and Uruguay
are countries with many
elements in common,
but religion has developed differently in each
society. Both societies are products
of colonial Catholicism as well as a
massive influx of immigrants—mostly Italian and Spanish—in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their religious development
was similar until that time, but by
the first decade of the last century
they had diverged: While Argentina
continued on the course of statebacked Catholicism, Uruguay began
a process of institutional separation.
Today the Catholic religion is
enshrined in Argentina’s constitution,

but Uruguay formally separated
church and state in 1919.
In Argentina the Catholic Church
has had and continues to play a
prominent role in society, political
life and the collective imagination,
and the percentage of Catholics is
around 76.5%.
In Uruguay, the early separation
of church and state—inspired by
the French model and as a result
of clashes between the nascent
state and the Catholic Church—
relegated Catholicism and religion
in general to the private sphere.
The percentage of Catholics in
Uruguay is somewhere between
47% y el 51%, according to
which poll is consulted.

A
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In all, a total of 91% of
Argentines say they believe in God,
compared to 83% of Uruguayans.
An additional 14.5% of
Uruguayans do not believe in God,
while 2.7% doubt that God exists.
The numerical differences are
clear: Argentina has higher percentages of both believers and Catholics,
while a greater percentage of
Uruguayans are atheists. For their
part, evangelicals make up a slightly
lower percentage in Argentina than
in Uruguay (9% vs. 11%).
Both countries reflect the growth
of a recent phenomenon: people
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Devotees of the Afro-American Umbandista religion prepare an offering during the celebration
of Iemanja, the African goddess of the sea, in Montevideo, Uruguay. Photo: Miguel
Rojo/AFP/Getty Images.

who say they believe in God but are
not affiliated with any institutional
religion. This group accounts for
7.3% of Argentines and as many as
23% of Uruguayans.
While Christians are the majority
in both countries (85.5% in
Argentina and 58% in Uruguay),
they represent a wide range of
denominations. These can be broken down into four main categories:
Catholics, Pentecostals, traditional
Protestants (Pentecostals account for
at least twice as many believers as
historical Protestants), and other
Evangelical groups.
Researchers began to take note of
the expansion of Pentecostal and
neo-Pentecostal churches in the
1980s and 90s. The growth of these
16
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groups was so rapid that many began
to wonder if the future of Latin
America would be Protestant instead
of Catholic.
Catholics, however, are not a
monolithic group; in fact, it would
probably be more accurate to speak
of “Catholicisms” instead of one
single brand of Catholicism. The
shades of difference among
Catholics deserve to be studied in
more detail. For most of its history, the hegemonic model of
Catholicism in Argentina has been
integralist Catholicism. While in
Uruguay, this type of Catholicism
has been in the minority due to the
separation of church and state.
Beyond the specific trends differentiating each country’s religious

history, some of which are reflected
in the percentages cited in this article, it is also worth mentioning
some similarities. Not least of these
is the obvious plurality of religion
in both countries. Recent qualitative research has revealed the
breadth and extent of local religion,
whose manifestations can be traced
back to different origins and time
periods. Some practices were transplanted from other countries and
cultures, especially eastern ones.
The African influence is clear, as are
localized outbursts of religiosity
centering on the veneration of sanctified local figures. This diversity
may not be reflected in the statistics
but it is an important characteristic
of the local religious landscape.
In both Argentina and Uruguay,
of course, the growing plurality of
religion has occurred in the context of social, political, economic
and cultural transformations at the
national and international levels.
At certain points in the twentieth
century some analysts predicted
the eventual disappearance of religion, reflecting both the decline in
sacramental Catholicism and the
growing trend toward secularization. Nevertheless, religious
dynamics have gone on developing
and transforming themselves.
Some scholars describe the current
climate as a return to religion,
while others of us prefer to interpret it as an adjustment to the
realities of our times and the multiple modernities that coexist in
the Río de la Plata region. n
Néstor Da Costa is a professor of
sociology specializing in the sociology
of religions. A native of Uruguay,
he is the coordinator of social and
religious studies at the CLAEH
University Institute in Montevideo
and coordinator of the Department
of Religious Studies at the Catholic
University of Uruguay.
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Globalization and Religious
Change in the Caribbean
By Laënnec Hurbon; Translated by Valerie Leteinturier
n its very foundations, the
Caribbean region contains various cultural and religious traditions like Hinduism, Islam,
Buddhism, Catholicism, and
Protestant confessions. In it, there are
also African religions derived from
the context of slave colonization.
Until the 1970s, leading religions
such as Roman Catholicism,
Anglicanism, Baptist and Methodist
Protestantism worked along with the
States, thus ensuring a sort of continuation of the colonial system, and
imposing a Western-type cultural
order. Nevertheless, from the 1970s
to the present, an array of religious
movements has been observed:
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Adventists, the
Japanese Mahikari, Moon followers,
Scientologists, Mormons, Catholic
dissidents such as the Apostles of
Infinite Love in the French portions
of the Caribbean, Rastafarians from
Jamaica, Palma Sola from the
Dominican Republic (a syncretic
movement mixing elements of AfroAmerican cults and Catholic practices). Simultaneously, there has
been a revitalization of AfroCaribbean beliefs and practices such
as the Haitian Voodoo, the Cuban
Santeria and the Shango Cult of
Trinidad. In the age of globalization,
what is the significance of this
change in the pattern of religions in
the Caribbean region? We shall
attempt to examine this change by
relating it to the problem of secularization and cultural diversity.
Two among the new religious
movements that we have just men-

I

Pilgrims gather for ritual bathing at the Saut d’Eau waterfall near the village of Ville Bonheur in
central Haiti. The pilgrimage to the waterfall takes place each year in July to commemorate the
appearance of the Virgin Mary at the site. The tradition mixes Catholicism and elements of the
vodou religion. Photo: David Stewart-Smith/Getty Images.

tioned stand out, becoming more
and more popular since the 1990s.
They seem to characterize themselves
by cutting across the Caribbean: the
Pentecostal and Rastafarian movements. They represent two cultural
orientations that appear to be diametrically opposed. However, let us
examine the changing background of
the region in the context of globalization. In fact, every Caribbean
country is going through social and
cultural upheaval, due to fast “deruralization” (drift from the land), wild
urbanization and, above all, massive
immigration to Western countries
(England, United States, Canada,
France, Holland). We also notice an
inter-Caribbean immigration, like
the influx of Haitians to the

Dominican Republic, the Bahamas
and the French West Indies (Guyana,
Martinique and Guadeloupe); or of
Dominicans to Guadeloupe. These
movements of population entail a
disorganization of family and community systems, and also call into
question traditional identity marks.
In this context, the regulations proceeding from leading religions that
had been established alongside
national States are weakened and any
individual find him/herself quite
helpless in a world which, to him or
her, seems to be going towards a cultural leveling out and where he or
she doesn’t find his/her points of reference anymore. Moreover this leveling out which remains the brand of
globalization is ironically far from
Hemisphere Volume 19
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calming the social and political tensions that are even on the rise in big
Caribbean cities like Port-au-Prince
or Kingston.
The Pentecostal and Rastafarian
movements are particularly symbolic
of the transformations of the religious Caribbean scene. On one
hand, as far as the Pentecostal movement is concerned, we witness a
drive to create a new family and
community living space which allows
the convert to get away from the
dominant world, now conceived as
an evil order, and to find a temporary shelter from the violence of daily
life and the risks associated with the
realms of work and politics. The
spectacular success of the Pentecostal
movement goes hand in hand with
the one of the Catholic charismatic
movement that, in fact, recognizes
that it shares the same origin as the
Pentecostal movement. Practices
such as speaking in tongues, reaching
a state of trance as a sign of the Holy
Spirit’s presence in the believer’s
body, and resorting to miraculous
healings, indicate a clear deviation
from the patterns of modern western
culture, for they imply that the converts genuinely start re-valuing the
afro-American religious traditions.
Indeed, said traditions are seen as evil
and interpreted as among the greatest sources of the evil and misery of
modern life. Curiously, though, they
are used as a support for the conversion process, which implies that
those beliefs are somehow kept alive
and well. Moreover, we are witnessing a re-vitalization of afro-American
cults a bit everywhere in the
Caribbean, just when they bear the
criticism of the Pentecostal and the
Charismatic Catholic movements
which deny them the ability to
address the different problems of
modern life (employment, housing,
marital status, violence, etc,). The
invisible forces to which an individual resorts within the context of
18
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Afro-American cult cannot be used
as a protection system and then, they
are over-symbolized as hunting down
forces moving around town.
At a different end of the religious
spectrum, we find the offensive of
Afro-American cults with a will to
affirm an otherwise failing cultural
identity. The Rastafarian movement
is appealing to the young in popular
urban neighborhoods, as well as in
the areas of the Caribbean Diaspora.
Contrary to the position of the
Pentecostal movement, the
Rastafarian movement, re-using the
imaginary of the African continent,
explicitly accepts the memory of the
slave trade and slavery itself. That
memory actually lurks within the
afro-American beliefs and practices.
The Rastafarian movement succeeds
in co-existing with Voodoo as well as
Islam in some popular neighborhoods of the Haitian capital. The
derogatory vision of Afro-American
cults is losing intensity and as
Protestant Confessions, Adventists
and Jehovah’s witnesses gain more
ground, Afro-American cults insist
even more on introducing themselves
in the public space, taking over some
chapels and Catholic churches, like
in Haiti, and especially to be
assertively taken as a source of inspiration in the Arts, including music,
dance and painting. In this same
context, the Taino-type Amerindian
traditions are re-vitalized through
afro-American cults like Santeria in
Cuba or what we call the Winti language in Surinam, Belize, and
English Guyana.
In any case, it seems that the new
forms of religious expressions developing in the Caribbean demonstrate
a change in the relationships of an
individual with his family and his
traditional community, in the sense
that he or she detaches himself or
herself from them and appears to be
left to fend for himself or herself; it is
precisely in the circumstances of fail-

ing identity marks that he or she
starts seeking a new social connection, imaginary and symbolic reference points that new religious movements are eager to offer. At the same
time, he or she steps onto a path
which leads him or her to put an end
to the memory of slavery (like the
Pentecostal movement), but this
memory stays alive and keeps on
pursuing him or her in the Holy
Spirit trances, beliefs in dreams, and
practices of miraculous healings, thus
reinforcing this memory and cultural
identity (like the Rastafarian movement and the revitalization of afroAmerican cults).
In any case, it is as if the secularization process is weakened by the
success of new religious movements
that are creating an actual reenchantment of social space, in spite
of a real progression of formal education in the region, for example in
the French-Caribbean regions,
Cuba, Puerto-Rico, the Dominican
Republic and the British-colonized
islands. At the same time, one cannot talk about cultural and religious
monolithism like in the past: the
plurality of religious movements
refers to a cultural diversity which
can be interpreted as an essential
characteristic of the Caribbean. It is
the states’ responsibility to take on
and defend the principle of secularism in order to protect this diversity
and put a brake on the propensity to
solve inter-religious conflicts
through violence. n
Laënnec Hurbon is a founding member and professor of Quisqueya
University in Port-au-Prince, as well
as a researcher at the CNRS. He has
written several socio-anthropological
works on subjects including Haitian
vodou and slavery, among them Le
barbare imaginaire (1988) and Pour
une sociologie d’Haiti au XXIe siècle (2001).
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Latinos and Religion in the
2008 Presidential Election
By Gastón Espinosa
atino communities are
transforming the complexion of American society. According to the US
Census Bureau, the
national population increased from
22.4 million in 1990 to 46 million
in 2008 (not including the four million residents of Puerto Rico and an
estimated 12 million undocumented
immigrants, the vast majority of
them Latinos). By official count, one
out of every six Americans is Latino,
accounting for 15% of the population. By 2050, the nation’s population will soar to 128 million, with
Latinos representing 29%.
Not surprisingly, this growth has
been felt politically as well. This article, based in a larger study, challenges the notions that Latino
Catholics and Protestants vote
Republican, that faith and morals
were dead issues in 2008, and that
President Obama, like Clinton
before him, has a lock on the Latino
vote. The majority (56%) of Latinos
identify themselves as Democrats,
17% as Republican, and 27% as
independent or other. Obama won
over religious Latino voters by providing a more bipartisan and compelling vision for economic recovery,
participating in faith forums, speaking openly about his Christian faith,
inviting Latino theologians and clergy onto his campaign team, splitting
the moral vote by supporting a
woman’s right to abortion but not
gay marriage, and reaching out energetically to Latino Catholics and
Protestants. These efforts helped

L

him gain a majority among devout
Latinos, contributing to his victory.
The Growing Value of Latinos in
Presidential Politics
One of the main reasons why
Latinos figured so prominently in
the 2008 election is their rapid
growth and concentration in strategic states. Latinos have added one
million new voters since 2004 and
make up a growing share of the electorate in states such as New Mexico
(37%), Texas (25%), California
(23%), Arizona (17%), Florida
(14%), Colorado (12%), Nevada

(12%) and New York (11%). We
can expect this trend to continue
given the fact that 10 million USborn Latinos are under the age of 18.
If only two out of five come of age
by 2010, the country will have four
million new Latino voters.
The youthfulness of the Latino
population, however, contributes to
the discrepancy between its absolute
numbers and voting capability. A
full 34% of Latinos are under the
voting age of 18 and 26% of those
who are of age are not US citizens.
Sixty percent of Latinos, therefore,
are ineligible to vote, compared to

Then Democratic presidential hopeful U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton speaks to members of a Puerto
Rican Pentecostal congregation in San Juan, Puerto Rico, during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Photo: Justin Sullivan/Getty Images.
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23% of Americans of European
descent, 34% of African Americans
and 49% of Asian Americans.
nThese factors have undermined
Latinos’ political clout; despite the
fact that they represented 15.3% of
the US population in 2008, they
accounted for only 9% of the electorate. In contrast, African
Americans made up 13%, Asian
Americans 2% and Americans of
European descent 74%.
Changing Religious Profile
According to the Latino Religions
and Politics (LRAP) National
Survey, 94% of Latinos self-identify
as Christian: 66% of them as
Catholic (30 million) and 34% as
Christian non-Catholic (15.6 million), Pentecostal and other
Christian (11.5 million), and
Protestant (9.2 million). The
growth of Evangelical Protestantism
among Latinos is politically significant because adherents to this faith
vote at higher rates than Catholics,
are concentrated in swing states,
and have shifted their vote by 20
points between election cycles. As
many as 600,000 Latinos convert to
Protestantism annually and a
Hispanic Churches in American
Public Life study found that for
every Latino who returns to
Catholicism, four leave it. Latino
Protestants and Evangelicals make
up as large or a larger share of the
electorate than Jews, Muslims,
Episcopalians or Presbyterians.
Sixty-seven percent of all Latino
Protestant and 24% of Latino
Catholic voters in the LRAP survey
self-identified as born-again
Christian. The numbers were similar among Latino registered voters:
65% of Protestants and 26%
Catholics self-identified as bornagain and Pentecostal or
Charismatic. When analyzed by
country of origin, Cubans,
Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans had
20
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the highest rates (59%+) of bornagain identity and Mexicans the
lowest (34%).
The Religious Vote
According to the LRAP survey,
77% of Latino Christian registered
voters report that religion provides
guidance in their day-to-day life,
including politics. The importance
of religion in the 2008 election was
evident in the finding that the majority (66%) of Latino registered voters
believed that a political candidate’s
personal faith and morals were relevant to their voting decisions. This
was true for both Latino Catholics
(58%) and Protestants (79%).
Did religion help McCain among
Latinos, as it did Bush in 2000 and
2004? The answer is no. In 2000
and 2004, Latino Catholics voted
Democrat and Protestants split their
votes—voting Democrat in 2000
and Republican in 2004. In
October 2008, the LRAP national
survey found that Obama was leading McCain among Latino registered
voters by 59% to 27%, with 14%
undecided. Significantly, Obama led
McCain among Latino Catholic
(63% vs. 24%), Protestant (50% vs.
34%), and born-again (46% vs.
38%) voters. Obama was able to
present himself as a genuine centrist
candidate on many religious issues.
His views, ideas and policies are a
blend of right- and left-of-center
impulses. Obama, like Clinton, recognizes what many Democrats do
not: Although the American electorate is “operationally progressive,”
it is nonetheless “philosophically
moderate conservative.”
The simple reason why this strategy works is that although many
Latino registered voters hold conservative moral and social views, no
single moral or religious issue
decides their vote. Latinos take a
holistic view of a candidate. They
place the candidate and his or her

views in a larger socio-religious context that takes into account a constellation of other issues, among
them social justice, a living wage,
jobs, immigration, health care, education, family, and a positive attitude toward Latin American immigrants and values. The top four
issues for Latino voters in 2008 were
jobs, the cost of living, education
and health care. These were followed by crime, the war in Iraq,
affordable housing, immigration
reform, abortion and gay marriage.
The decisive level of Latino support for Obama contributed to his
victories in key swing states for two
reasons. First, the Latino electorate
in those states was larger—in some
cases significantly larger—than
Obama’s margin of victory. Second,
Latinos voted for Obama by a decisive margin in all four swing states at
much higher rates than they did for
Kerry in 2004. Obama won a
majority of the Latino vote in
Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico and
even Florida, a state Bush carried in
2004 by a wide majority. Latino
support for Obama in these states
surpassed his margin of victory:
12.4% vs. 9% in Colorado, 7.9%
vs. 2% in Florida, 12.4% vs. 12% in
Nevada and 28.3% vs. 15% in New
Mexico. The Latino electorate was
critical to Obama’s victory in these
states and will remain so in future
presidential politics given its rapid
growth in numbers.
Religion and Moral Views
One of the keys to Obama’s success in 2008 was his ability to win
over a plurality of Latino moderates
and even the most religious Latino
voters—those who opposed abortion
and gay marriage, read the Bible,
prayed and attended church once a
week or more. By opposing gay
marriage but supporting abortion,
Obama split the Latino moral vote,
allowing religious Latinos to rational-
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ize that Obama agreed with them on
at least one of two key moral issues.
Was this mere political expediency,
given that gays and lesbians make up
less than 4% of the US electorate,
compared to the almost half of the
population that opposes abortion in
one form or another? Perhaps, but it
was a strategy that helped pave the
way to victory.
While McCain too reached out to
religious voters, his outreach was
limited in scope, vision and creativity
and lacked genuine passion on faith
issues. Obama and his team ran a
brilliant campaign by outflanking
McCain on traditional Republican
issues, including faith-based initiatives. Obama also courted and put
on his campaign team Catholic,
Evangelical and Pentecostal Latino
leaders, defined many of the campaign issues, took the initiative on
promoting faith issues in the election, and responded rapidly and
effectively to McCain’s critiques, thus
neutralizing Republican rallying
points. In addition, many Latino
Catholic and Evangelical leaders supported immigration reform, a topic
anathema to some Republicans.
Finally, McCain did not put any
major financial resources behind his
outreach to Latino Catholics and
Evangelicals, in contrast to Obama,
who announced plans to invest $20
million into outreach to the Latino
community. His efforts paid off, as
he won not only among Latino religious moderates but also a plurality
of Latino conservative voters who
opposed gay marriage.
Obama made it clear to these voters that he was a person of genuine
faith and a religious moderate. A key
element of this persona was his
strong and outspoken support of
church-state partnerships aimed at
alleviating inner city poverty and
drug abuse. In his autobiography,
The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on
Reclaiming the American Dream

(2006), which came out in Spanish a
year and a half before the election,
Obama discussed the organic link
between faith and social change. He
reaffirmed the link between religion,
morality and social transformation
and urged the US government to
partner with faith-based programs to
“feed the hungry, reform the prisoner,
rehabilitate the drug addict, and keep
the veteran employed.”
Going one step further than JFK
but still echoing Democratic presidents before him, Obama chided secularists for asking religious believers
to leave their religion and morality at
the door of American public life. He
argued that many of the greatest
American reformers were shaped by
faith, including Frederick Douglass,
Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings
Bryan, Dorothy Day and Martin
Luther King, Jr. “To say that men
and women should not inject their
‘personal morality’ into public-policy
debates is a practical absurdity,”
Obama concluded. “Our law is by
definition a codification of morality,
much of it grounded in the JudeoChristian tradition.”
Perhaps the most compelling reason why Latino Catholics and
Evangelical Protestants were comfortable with voting for Obama was his
spiritual journey. Although critics
charged that he emphasized this
point to counter rumors that he was
a Muslim, distance himself from the
Reverend Jeremiah Wright and show
that he wasn’t simply a traditional liberal Protestant, Obama began talking
about his spiritual development long
before the campaign began (perhaps
anticipating later criticism). He won
the support of many Latinos by proclaiming, “I let Jesus Christ into my
life” and “learned that my sins could
be redeemed and if I placed my trust
in Jesus, that he could set me on a
path to eternal salvation.” This kind
of Evangelical narrative resonated
with many Latino Christians.

Future Democratic Support
It is impossible to predict whether
the Latino Catholic and Protestant
faith communities will remain loyal
to Obama and the Democratic Party
in 2012, although history cautions
that what goes up can come down.
George W. Bush’s ability to cut into
the Latino Protestant and Catholic
vote in 2004 despite Clinton’s overwhelming victories in 1992 and
1996 reveals that a Republican
Catholic or Protestant born-again
candidate who is positive, youthful
in spirit, compassionate, down-toearth and committed to social justice
could flip the Protestant vote again,
making enough inroads among
Catholics to win key swing states
and perhaps the presidency.
Similarly, the question of whether
Obama’s outreach efforts were genuine or a ploy to win the Latino
Catholic and Evangelical vote will be
answered by his political appointments and policy decisions.
Obama owed his victory in 2008
to the economy, Latino Catholics
and Protestants in key swing states,
his bipartisan and optimistic vision
for social change and economic
recovery, and a 4-14% increase in
support among religious, racial-ethnic minority and women voters. His
vision attracted Latino voters because
it provided hope for a better tomorrow. Whether or not this will
enable him to surpass Clinton’s historic Latino support in 2012 remains
to be seen, but history, initiative and
inspiration are—at least at this
moment—on his side. n
Gastón Espinosa is the Arthur V.
Stougton Associate Professor of
Religious Studies at Claremont
McKenna College. He is the president
of La Comunidad of Hispanic
Scholars of Religion at the American
Academy of Religion and co-editor of
the Columbia University Press Series
in Religion and Politics.
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Religion and Politics in Latin
America since the 1970s
By Daniel H. Levine
nderstanding the relation between religion
and politics in Latin
America since the
1970s requires equal
attention to both spheres. The transformations of politics, and the social
and cultural changes that underlie
them: military authoritarian rule, civil
wars, restoration of democracy, economic crises, the spread of literacy
and access to mass media, internal
migration and urbanization together
provide the context within which the
great transformations of religion gain
meaning and direction. These
include the theology of liberation, the
end of a 500-year Catholic monopoly
and the surge of Pentecostal and neoPentecostal churches, the need of all
churches to adapt to pluralism and
competition, and the place of churches in civil society and politics in the
democratic period beginning in the
mid 1980s.
This article examines four aspects
of these transformations: the vision
manifest in the Latin American
Episcopal Conference (CELAM V)
at Aparecida, Brazil in May 2007;
religious pluralism and competition
among churches; the new role of
churches in civil society; and the
relationship between the many kinds
of violence in this period and
changes in the churches as well as in
patterns of religious affiliation, belief
and practice.

U

Aparecida
In the period preceding Aparecida,
the world that Catholic leaders saw
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The faithful wave flags of South American countries as Pope Benedict XVI presides over Mass,
opening the 5th general meeting of CELAM in front of Brazil’s most famous shrine in the city of
Aparecida. Photo: Franco Origlia/Getty Images.

around them was utterly different
from the one in which most had been
born and raised. The unquestioned
monopoly of the Catholic Church
had eroded, replaced by a plurality of
churches and pervasive competition
among them for members, space,
public sanction and goods. Statistics
show that the number of people
declaring themselves “Catholic” has
declined steadily while the rate of
Protestant affiliation (especially
Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal
churches) has grown sharply, along
with small but notable segments
claiming to be católico a mi manera
(“Catholic in my own way”) or no
connection to any religion at all. The
Catholic Church no longer monopolizes public discourse about morality:
It must share the airwaves, TV

screens, public platforms and arenas
of power with other churches.
Within Catholicism itself there is a
growing diversity of opinion with
many voices competing to be heard.
These trends have continued despite
the efforts of many prelates to rein in
division by cutting funds to dissident
groups and striving for greater control
over schools, universities and publications.
The decay of the Catholic monopoly and the growth of pluralism have
occurred in the context of the democratization of civil society and politics
in the last two decades. This process
has moved religious groups, issues and
leaders off the center stage of public
debate and political discussions.
Christian Democratic or explicitly
Protestant parties or candidacies have
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weakened substantially and there has
been a deliberate pull back on how
and how much the institutional
churches sponsor social movements.
Religious groups have returned to
more traditional lobbying for a core
group of conventional issues surrounding education, public morality
and sexuality and away from the
social justice issues that dominated
the 1980s and 1990s.
In combination, these changes have
profoundly altered how religion is
present in the public sphere. In much
of the region, images and symbols of
religious-civic fusion once affirmed
the identification of “the Church”
(only one was recognized) with political and economic power and social
hierarchy. The public face of religion
is very different now: Street preachers
need only a Bible, a loudspeaker and
something to stand on to make their
pitch, new churches proliferate, and
many voices jostle for space and attention. Where there was monopoly
there is now pluralism; where a limited number of spaces were once officially reserved for religious observance
(with a limited number of authorized
practitioners) there is now a rich profusion of churches, chapels and mass
media programming, not to mention
campaigns and crusades that carry
the message to hitherto “profane”
spaces such as streets and squares,
beaches, sports stadiums, jails, bars
and nightclubs.
When the region’s Catholic bishops
met at Aparecida, their stated goal was
to preserve, enrich and extend the
Catholic faith of the region’s peoples,
which they described as “a fundamental basis of the identity, originality and
unity of Latin America and the
Caribbean” and “among its greatest
riches.” This rich tradition of faith
provided the context for the overall
theme of the meetings: the role of the
church and faithful as missionary disciples, a theme that was echoed by the
Pope in his opening speech and

underscored throughout the conference documents.
The discussions at Aparecida and
the final documents approved there
underscored the value of Latin
America’s Catholic tradition and identity but saw these as highly threatened
in the future. The future as seen at
Aparecida is filled with peril: dangers
from cultural inroads into Catholic
ideas of a proper moral sphere (especially with regard to traditional gender
roles) and the role of the church in
ordering that sphere; the related dissolution of a world view once united
around the Catholic faith and guided
by its official leaders; the threat of
competition by other churches (especially neo-Pentecostal); and the danger
posed by indifference, apathy and the
trend toward catolicismo a mi manera,
disengaged from church supervision
and discipline, all of this in a context
of social dissolution accelerated by
poverty, violence and drugs.
This list of dangers was balanced by
nuanced recognition of progress in
politics (democracy), education,
human rights and recognition of
excluded groups, especially indigenous
communities and those of African
descent. But the predominant note
sounded at the conference, was fear of
loss and fear of control. These fears
are grounded in a particular understanding of change in contemporary
Latin America. What is the force
behind this change, who are its agents
and what does it mean for the church
as an institution and collection of
faithful? A highly compressed answer
is that globalizing forces (economic
and cultural, visible for example in
the mass media) are undermining cultural unity, reordering social roles and
destroying important values and relations of authority. The fact that the
Catholic Church is no longer an
unchallenged moral arbiter is taken a
sign of loss of control and in that
sense of the unity that characterized
the past.

Facing a situation seen in this way,
an institution like the Catholic
Church (accustomed for so long to
dominant cultural influence) has several options. It can simply adapt and
go with the flow, engage as a participant in the process with its own message and enthusiasm, or resist change,
rebuilding its structures and reorganizing around a common purpose and
leadership. Aparecida takes the third
option. Whether or not it works, and
what policies it may generate, will
depend on how accurate its underlying analysis of reality turns out to be.
Religious Pluralism and the
Encounter with Democracy
Plurality and pluralism are reshaping the public face of religion in Latin
America as they intersect with the
equally new fact of pluralism in politics and civil society. A plurality of
churches, social movements and voices claim the moral authority to speak
in the name of religion. This is a
two-way street, a dialectical relationship: Just as religious plurality and
pluralism transform social and political life, putting more actors, voices,
and options into play, so too the consolidation and expansion of democratic politics, participation and a plural civil society have a visible impact
on the daily life of religion and the
ways religious institutions situate
themselves in society and politics.
The most obvious expression of
religious plurality and pluralism in
Latin America is the sheer number of
churches, religious venues and
spokespersons and the competition
for members, loyalties and resources.
In a real sense there is more religion
available in Latin America now than
in the past: more churches, more
chapels, greater presence in the mass
media, more opportunities for participation and a greater variety of religiously-based or inspired groups. In
response to this trend, as we have
already seen, the Catholic Church has
Hemisphere Volume 19
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reorganized and redirected its institutional resources (with Vatican sanction) away from support of social
groups and innovative religious voices
to a re-sacralization of its projected
message. As a part of this process, it
has placed greater emphasis on issues
defined as moral and corresponding
pressure on groups and individuals to
refrain from “undue politicization.”
Another response to the explosion of
religious options is what Timothy
Steigenga terms the “pentecostalization” of religious belief and practice.
Elements once limited to Protestant
(and specifically Pentecostal) experience, including stress on the direct
experience of charismatic power, faith
healing, speaking in tongues, certain
kinds of music and patterns of group
organization and leadership have been
diffused widely throughout the
Christian community.
All this does not mean that Latin
America is “becoming Protestant,” to
cite the title of an important early
book by David Stoll. Rather, the
region is becoming pluralist for the
first time in its history and in a way
that provides general support for
democracy. Although the orientations
and alliances of particular churches
are located all across the political spectrum and at all levels of the social
structure, with rare exceptions, all of
the region’s churches, now support
democracy and an open civil society.
The pattern of political change over
the last few decades has had important and often unexpected impacts on
religion. As democratic politics have
been restored and expanded across the
continent, churches and religious
leaders have lost (and sometimes
deliberately abandoned) their openly
political roles. To the extent to which
political parties and a “normal political life” have regained strength and
presence, the viability of civil society
groups with some link to churches
has declined. Church leaders have cut
their moral and material support to
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groups, and in any case, members
have more options now in an open
civil society. Explicitly religious political parties or voting blocs have also
had limited success. Among
Evangelicals, such parties have been
unable to mobilize or guarantee a bloc
vote of the faithful, nor have they
attracted masses of voters of any kind.
Christian Democrats remain strong
only in Chile (with relatively little
trace remaining of the impact of
Catholic Social Doctrine), and efforts
to create explicitly Protestant parties
have had limited success. The very
idea of a confessional state, which resonates strongly in some fundamentalist circles, finds little echo in Latin
American Protestantism.
Social and cultural pluralism, along
with emerging democratic rules of the
game in politics, also challenge the
activist collection of groups, ideas and
practices that emerged within
Catholicism in the crucible of the
1970s to 1990s. For those inspired
by Liberation Theology, the global
and regional collapse of the left has
required wrenching reappraisals of
democracy as a goal and of the meaning of politics and political activity.
Accommodation, compromise and
alliance building are more the norm
in plural societies than revolution. In
many countries, activists have been
drawn out of religiously inspired
groups into ordinary politics. At the
same time, the Catholic Church as an
institution has opted to move out of
the center of political activity and
reduce its support for groups and
movements.
Plurality and pluralism bring challenges to the growing Protestant community as well. In the attention paid
to the overall rate of growth of
Protestantism, it is sometimes easy to
ignore the process of change embedded in the numbers. New churches
grow faster than old ones; Pentecostals
grow faster than other groups (including mainline churches and fundamen-

talists); and churches in urban settings
grow faster than others. The wellestablished historical tendency to fissiparous growth within Protestantism is
fully exemplified in contemporary
Latin America. Competition among
Protestant churches and alternative
national and continental confederations—for members, resources and a
public voice—is now as notable as
Protestant-Catholic competition.
This continuing and accelerating
growth has brought a shift in the public presence of Protestantism and the
elaboration of innovative means of
managing its new status in a changed
political arena. No longer isolated
minorities and weak supplicants for
public recognition, Protestant churches have vigorously pressed claims to
equal status in the public sphere and a
share of the benefits (including subsidies for schools) long allocated to the
Catholic Church. In case after case,
churches, interchurch alliances and
individual figures have moved actively
to engage in what was once seen as
the tainted and corrupting world of
politics. At the same time, Protestant
churches have engaged broader issues
and entered into a wide range of
social and political alliances that
would have been unimaginable a few
decades ago.
Political opening, along with growing pluralism within the Protestant
community, has brought several
important elements to the scene.
New leadership and utterly new leadership styles have emerged, along with
media skills and careers in religious or
other broadcasting as steppingstones
to politics. There has also been a
notable revaluation of politics itself:
Once seen as the realm of corruption
and evil, it is now presented as a possible, legitimate and even necessary
field of action for believers. Where
once the children of light were
enjoined to concentrate above all on
personal salvation and building a
community of the elect, they now
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visualize politics, despite the dangers it
holds, as a central part of their identity and responsibility. The explosive
growth of these churches has, not surprisingly, drawn in new members
with a wide variety of experiences,
careers and orientations. The experience of Brazil is particularly well documented, with self-identified
Evangelicals (many of them adult
converts) present in parties and movements across the ideological spectrum.
Pluralism offers opportunities as
well as challenges. Among the most
notable is the chance to acquire new
followers, to reach and energize them
in new ways, and to exploit new
media. Another is the opportunity
to develop ways of acting in politics
and relating to potential political
allies and partners. This task is complicated by the fact of a more open,
less regulated civil society and by the
more open kind of politics that has
accompanied transitions to democracy. At the very least, more open politics means the possibility of greater
choice, more options to compete for
the allegiance and membership of
one’s audience and less regulation of
the effort. Protestants in many
countries have devoted substantial
effort to leveling the playing field,
above all by sharing in public subsidies hitherto limited to Catholic
institutions and by removing or
fighting barriers to the ordinary life
of their communities, such as laws
regulating “noisy churches.”
These new democratic realities
have nurtured and at the same time
benefited from a consistent effort on
the part of many churches to create
a democratic presence within society.
But as democracies have consolidated, much of this effort has moved
out of politics to civil society, where
both Catholic and Protestant
churches remain active in a range of
efforts from social centers to schools,
neighborhood associations, cooperatives and other movements.

The Churches and Civil Society, the
Churches as Civil Society
The relation between churches and
civil society has changed notably in
recent years. The Catholic Church,
followed not long after by many
Protestant churches, played a critical
role in Latin America in the creation,
promotion and protection of social
movements of all kinds. As sponsors,
churches provided access to resources,
information and leadership training
while facilitating cooperation between
religiously inspired activists and other
grassroots groups. They also provided
material aid and legal defense when
necessary. With the restoration of
democracy and the weakening of
many of these movements, churches
continue to function in civil society
through less confrontational groups as
well as through networks of schools,
local and regional radio, cooperatives
and health centers.
Throughout the region, the transitions to democracy of the last 30
years have been accompanied by the
marginalization and demobilization
of many of the same popular movements that played an important role
in these transitions. The struggle was
difficult, costly and exhausting, and
by the end many groups had weakened, divided or disappeared.
Successive economic crises meant that
for many the daily struggle for survival took precedence over collective
and political efforts. The difficulties
that so many groups experienced in
consolidating themselves, and even in
surviving, were exacerbated by the
impact of neoliberal economic policies that created obstacles to collective
organization. The restructuring of
the state and of public institutions
effectively eliminated many instances
in which citizens could present
demands and exercise political pressure. In this way, neoliberal reforms
that were in theory directed at
increasing citizen participation in
practice helped reduce it.

The resituating of the institutional
church within civil society as one
group among many has been accompanied by the development of a civil
society within the church itself, manifest in the proliferation of research
centers, radio and television stations,
and groups of all kinds. Catalina
Romero writes that “through these
distinct forms of association and new
spaces for encounter and interaction,
the church has renovated itself and
has been able to infuse the challenges
of daily life with religious meaning.
Over the last decade, there has begun
a process of closing these same spaces,
due to the intervention of various
bishops who are trying to re-take control of public spaces within the
church, as well as of the forms in
which the church expresses itself and
is represented in civil society, politics,
and the state.”
The tendency that Romero notes
for Peru is evident in many countries.
Groups of all kinds abound, but they
are fragmented and lack the ability to
sustain themselves or exercise enduring influence in public life. The
groups and movements promoted by
the church in years past (the comunidades eclesiales de base, for example)
turned out to be much more vulnerable to the withdrawal of support by
the institutional church than many
early observers imagined. Fearful of
division and loss of control, bishops
often try to subordinate groups, cutting financial and organizational support and taking measures to gain
greater control over schools, seminaries, universities and publications.
The cumulative weight of changes in
Vatican policies over the past few
decades—the naming of conservative
bishops, removal from their posts of
sympathetic clergy, withdrawal of
official backing from groups deemed
to be excessively “politicized,” drastic
reductions in the flow of human and
material resources and the closing of
institutions of great symbolic value,
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among them Chile’s Vicariate of
Solidarity—have had a devastating
impact on many groups.
Issues of gender and ethnicity play a
prominent role in many of the religiously inspired or connected groups
and movements in question. The very
visible role often played by women
reflected their relative availability, their
closeness to issues such as the cost of
living, as well as the belief that
women might be less subject to retaliation. With the restoration of
democracy, these movements and
their activists lost the direct support of
churches whose leaders sought to
“normalize” relations with the state
and elite and clearly expected female
activists to return home. The results
of this demobilization varied according to the circumstances of each case,
with very different results for the
activists themselves. In Chile, for
example, a strong church investment
in human and material resources was
accompanied by greater control and
direction from the hierarchy, resulting
in groups that were more dependent
with a lower capacity for managing
on their own. In Brazil, in contrast,
the operative model of the “popular
church” encouraged greater independence on the part of groups, with fewer
resources and much less top down
supervision. As the institutional
churches cut back their commitment
and reduced their support, Chilean
women were left weaker, more disoriented and much more resentful than
their Brazilian counterparts, who
ended up more autonomous, confident and open to alliances with other
civil society groups, albeit with fewer
resources.
The role of religiously sponsored
movements in ethnic communities
and their relation to questions of
identity has also undergone far-reaching changes in recent years.
Historically, the task of missionary
work was to “civilize” indigenous peoples and replace their traditions and
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practices with the new message of the
Gospels. Beginning in the 1970s, this
model was challenged by another that
affirmed the value of indigenous cultures, respected the presence of God
in their traditions, incorporated
indigenous peoples into the clergy
and trained clergy in indigenous languages. In some countries, churches
have also assisted indigenous communities in the pursuit of their claims to
lands and rights. This has been most
notable in the Andean region, northeastern Brazil and Guatemala. In
Bolivia and Ecuador, churches have
played a key role in building networks
of indigenous organizations, including
communal radio and the creation of
new political parties.
As noted, many of the groups that
arose in civil society in the 1970s and
1980s have failed, dispersed or at the
very least weakened substantially. But
even though the hopes of those
involved have often been frustrated
and cut short, these church-supported
movements helped open the public
sphere to individuals and groups
whose voices had hitherto been silent
or tuned out, creating a series of
spaces that simply did not exist
before: neighborhood associations,
women’s groups, cooperatives, communal kitchens, cultural associations,
sports clubs, micro businesses, new
unions and protesters of all kinds.
Although only a handful of these can
trace explicitly religious origins or
sponsorship, many enjoyed close ties
to churches and religious groups with
whom they exchanged ideas, agendas,
personnel and resources.
These groups did not create democracy by themselves. Many are not
explicitly political nor can they be
understood as social movements, if we
understand this to refer to formally
constituted groups whose explicit
objective is to pursue claims and seek
material or symbolic goods from the
state for their members. If we broaden the definition, however, we can

argue that these groups advanced
ideas, movements and networks that
emerged as part of the effort to create
linkages and points of entry between
the state and political parties and the
daily lives of citizens.
Violence and Religion in
Recent History
Latin American history over the
last 50 years has been deeply marked
by the relation between violence and
religious change. Both violence and
religion come in many forms, and it is
useful to distinguish among the most
notable kinds of violence and religious
transformations in this period.
Violence can be distinguished by its
level as well as its source and intention. On the most generalized level is
civil war, such as the conflicts in
Central America, Peru and Colombia.
There has also been an important
phenomenon of state repression on a
scale not seen before. A new element
in the violence of the last 50 years has
been a systematic attack on churches,
creating many martyrs among bishops, clergy, nuns, catechists and lay
people. Such attacks have been most
frequent in civil wars and in countries
where repressive state held power for
many years (Chile, Brazil, Argentina
and Uruguay).
The phenomenology of violence is
of course not limited to politics at the
national level. There is also an ever
present violence of daily life, experienced everyday in the form of crime,
domestic abuse, unemployment and
poor health, among others. In the
discourse of Latin American
Catholicism since the landmark bishops’ conference of Medellín (1968), it
has been common to incorporate
these phenomena under the rubrics of
institutionalized violence and structural sin, underscoring the impact of
elements such as unemployment, economic inequality, poor health, low life
expectancy and social injustice on
individual and community life. But
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although the notion of institutionalized violence has been influential in
many Catholic circles in Latin
America, it often fails to highlight and
denounce the violence of daily life,
including alcoholism, drugs, crime,
local or family vendettas, and the
domestic violence and physical abuse
inflicted on women and children,
which is often related to these elements. Personal and community
experiences of such violence have led
many people to Pentecostal and neoPentecostal churches, which offer a
way out of a difficult and dangerous
life via entry into a new and supportive community of faith.
Much of the impact of violence on
churches and religious life stems
from the victimization of churches
and religious personnel. In the
midst of repression and open civil
war, churches have often defended
the victims, in the process becoming
targets themselves. Religious personnel and church institutions such as
radio stations or educational organizations became prime targets of violence in El Salvador, Guatemala,
Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru.
The direct experience of official terror led many in the churches to see
themselves as victims, to identify
with victims and to ally themselves
with victims in defense of their
rights. Churches and church-sponsored organizations became prime
protagonists of human rights movements and key intermediaries in
processes of peace, reconciliation and
the recovery of historical memory.
Where repressive states held sway,
church hierarchies and the institutions they directed acted both as
opposition and complicit ally: opposition in Brazil and Chile, complicit
ally in Argentina.
The long-term psychosocial consequences of violence have created a
legacy in Latin America of fear, nightmares, suicide, alienation, broken
families and the erosion of communi-

ty as a result of forced migration and
the prohibition of public rituals of
mourning. One result has been a
wave of conversions to new churches
that offer a way out of a violent world
through a change of life and entry
into a community of faith that provides moral and material help in
negotiating the threats and dangers of
daily life. For its part, the Catholic
Church has articulated issues of justice, rights, participation and liberation and made a sustained effort to
give these a prime place in the agenda
of institutions and groups. Beginning
with the Medellín (1968) and Puebla
(1979) conferences, which further
articulated the theology of liberation
and carried it to the public sphere in
numerous pastoral letters and the programs and commitments of groups
and social movements, elements in
the Catholic Church broke traditional
alliances with political and social
power and put themselves on the side
of those seeking change.
To put oneself on the side of
change in this period in Latin
America has varied meanings: forming and supporting reformist groups
and Christian Democratic parties;
backing social movements of slum
dwellers or landless peasants; providing legal, moral and material support
for new trade union movements; even
allying with insurgent movements, as
in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Such
positions are costly and bring resistance from governments, and often
from the high leadership of the
churches themselves. Once the external pressure of violence declines (as
has occurred with the end of civil war
and the transition to democratic politics throughout the region), many
church leaders have look to cut their
losses, rebuild good relations with
states and social elites, and return to a
more conventional agenda centered
on personal morality, issues of sexuality and family, and the search for public subsidies. The salient point, how-

ever, is that the initial impulse for
change was rooted in reaction to the
experience of massive violence and the
search for a meaningful and appropriate response.
This confluence of interests helped
open the churches to a new set of
ideas about rights and turned their
leaders and institutions into promoters of human rights. In Brazil, Chile,
El Salvador, Peru (and later,
Guatemala) the institutional Catholic
Church (with support from transnational networks) provided critical
resources in support of human rights
and to victims of repression, helping
families find shelter and work, with
legal assistance, and in the difficult
task of finding the disappeared. The
defense of classic human rights (to be
free from arbitrary arrest, abuse and
torture and to reject the impunity of
political leaders, military and police)
was accompanied by efforts to promote and make effective the right to
collective organization (by the landless, by slum dwellers, by indigenous
communities) and in general to assert
the right of the poor and powerless to
participate in political and social life.
The incorporation of a commitment to rights as an integral part of
discourse and agenda was not limited
to Catholicism. Within the
Protestant community, there are
numerous examples of churches,
national and regional organizations,
and lay groups that joined ecumenical
coalitions in defense of human rights
while acting in defense of their own
churches and membership. The
impulse for change came in response
to the direct experience of violence.
In Peru, Protestant and Pentecostal
churches grew exponentially in the
1980s and 1990s, a period that coincides with the rising arc of violence
related to the Shining Path insurrection. Many churches and communities found themselves trapped
between the guerrillas (who targeted
any group that tried to mobilize the
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population) and the repressive actions
of the army, police and Special Forces.
As the toll of victims grew within the
Protestant churches, the National
Council of Evangelicals of Peru
(CONEP) began to create organizations and to take public positions in
defense of human rights. With the
defeat of Shining Path and the decline
of large-scale violence, pressure arose
within the Protestant community to
return to a more traditional emphasis
on preaching the word of God,
“growing the church” and keeping out
of politics.
The commitment to rights was
not shared by all the churches. A
transformation of this magnitude
does not happen without costs or
resistance. In the context of what
was presented as a war against subversion and leftist atheism, some
churches reinforced their ties with
state and military, articulated a position of Christian nationalism, and
became deeply involved in repression
and complicit in tortures and disappearances. Argentina is the best
known and best documented case of
this kind, but even in this case, reality is less homogeneous than might
appear at first glance. During the
1970s, important liberationist currents were present in the Argentine
Catholic Church. They promoted
social mobilizations and allied themselves with elements of Peronism to
form the base of the Montonero
movement. They were ultimately
marginalized within the institutional
church, defeated politically, and in
many cases arrested, tortured, and
killed. With the transition to democracy, the broad discrediting of the
military, and the election of Peronist
governments willing to break traditional ties to the Catholic hierarchy
(beginning with the government of
Nestor Kirchner) the country has
begun to experience a genuine religious pluralism, still resisted by the
bulk of the Catholic hierarchy.
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Conclusions
The events of the last 40 years
present deep, conflicted and interrelated transformations in the panorama of Latin American religion. To
draw a balance, it is helpful to
underscore how very different the
word of religion and politics is now
(2009) from then (1970).
Catholicism’s 500-year monopoly is
gone and will not return; religious
pluralism is not merely present but
continues to grow. Democracy has
established itself almost everywhere
in the region, with notable consequences including the end of civil
wars and a substantial reduction in
political (albeit not everyday) violence. Confessional political parties
(those linked to a particular church)
have not prospered, and in general
churches have withdrawn from the
center stage of politics. This does
not mean they have abandoned all
actions of a political nature; most
churches and religious groups continue to lobby governments on issues
such as birth control, family law,
public morality and education and
continue a constant search for official
subsidies, support and recognition.
Religion, in all the variants of
Christianity, appears to be flourishing,
but it is not the Christianity of 40
years ago. There have been too many
changes in society, culture and in the
churches themselves for that to be the
case. What Fortunato Mallimaci has
said about Argentina holds true for
the region in general:
Today in Argentina people do not
believe—be it in politics or in religion—more or less than in other periods
but differently. Politics has not disappeared but rather is “exploding” and
“emerging” outside, above, below and
within the old structures of political parties. Nor do we find ourselves in the
presence of religious groups that are
“static,” “pressured,” seeking shelter in
the “private” or which are no more than
“a reflection of socio economic struc-

tures.” Instead we face groups that are
dynamic, active in all social classes,
which move and pressure for their own
objectives, which can be short or long
term, with a multiplicity of ties not only
within the religious sphere but also
throughout social life… Believing and
belonging, believing without belonging,
and belonging without believing are
part of the various options that men and
women find today as they look to give
meaning to their religious life.
Do the past four decades have any
lessons for the future? Although it is
always risky to extrapolate current
trends into the future, some elements
of the process of change appear well
established. The combination of
intense religious transformations with
a return to democracy makes it likely
that churches will continue to withdraw from partisan politics to cut
their losses and recover strength. At
the same time, they will fall back on
more conventional themes and efforts
to gain privileges and legitimacy along
with the resources and tools they need
to maintain and grow their institutions. Competition among churches
will continue, intensify and spread to
new areas. There will be a continued
diffusion of intense and spirit-filled
forms of religious practice (in the
Pentecostal style), the region’s
Protestant churches will continue to
become more independent from their
origins in the north, and these
churches will intensify the projection
of their message to the global south
and back to the north. n
Daniel H. Levine is a professor of
political science at the University of
Michigan. He is the editor of such
books as Popular Voices in Latin
American Catholicism, Religion and
Political Conflict in Latin America
and Constructing Culture and
Power in Latin America.

C O M M E N T A R I E S

Christian Reorder in
Latin America
By Fortunato Mallimaci; Translated by Alisa Newman
s part of the reconfiguration of social structures and beliefs in
recent decades, Latin
America has transitioned from a virtual Catholic
monopoly to a plural and diverse
Christian majority characterized by
the spread of Pentecostalism and a
growing number of people claiming
no religion at all.
Secularization does not mean the
disappearance or privatization of religious beliefs but rather their continuous reordering. Capitalism’s multiple
modernities are not linear, nor are
they evolutionary; they are indeterminate and multidirectional, and no

A

one can predict their outcomes.
Going beyond what is normative
and prescriptive to analyze concrete
situations is a challenge that scientific
studies cannot ignore.
The historical foundation of the
nation-state (alternating democracies
and dictatorships under multiple neocolonialisms), policies to expand citizenship—or not, the type of social
framework, the formation of social
movements and the role played by
Christian movements—Catholicism
during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, along with Evangelicalism in
the twenty-first—are a central part of
the socio-religious narratives that have
dominated our national histories.

The crisis of the state, along
with privatization and deregulation, has dislocated not only our
material existence but also our
symbols, memories and expectations. During the longest democratic period the region has ever
known, life is full of contradictions, both among states and within them—on the one hand, the
heterogeneity of poverty and the
penal/repressive control of populations destabilized by unemployment; on the other, the extension
of new rights of citizenship to vast
sectors of the population accompanied by an aggressive rebuilding of
state and civil society capacities.

French nun Yvonne Pierron speaks during an ecumenical celebration in honor of French nun Leonie Duquet, kidnapped and murdered by navy forces
during Argentina’s military dictatorship. Photo: Daniel Garcia/AFP/Getty Images.
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Categories such as time, space and
promise have been reformulated in
such a way that—especially for
young people—time has been transformed into something instantaneous, into a permanent presence
that makes it hard to plan for the
future. The world-space has been
expanded by new information technologies, and globalization and the
collective promises of a better tomorrow have lost credibility, and this
leads to many individual exit plans.
Meaningful institutions—the state,
family, labor unions, churches, political parties—no longer create longterm legitimacies and are being eroded
in our so-called “liquid modernity.”1
Religious Institutions and Beliefs
A quick look at institutions and
beliefs on the continent shows us an
active market in salvation and a
broad religious field with strong
demands and multiple sources of
supply. Religiosity does not end with
institutions and religious beliefs are
not only channeled through clergy.
In Brazil, Catholics make up
73.8% of the population and
Evangelicals 15.6%, ranking it as one
of the Latin American countries with
the highest percentage (and absolute
numbers) of Evangelicals
(17,733,477 Pentecostals and
8,477,068 mission-oriented
Evangelicals). The category “no religion” is as high as 8%.
Ricardo Salas confirms the growing plurality of religion in Brazil.
“The Catholic Church may still be
the majority religion (73%),” he
writes, “but there has been sustained
growth by Evangelicals (16%) (who,
on the one hand, tend to look to
their neighborhoods for meaning
and, on the other, tend to be more
indifferent toward democracy than
Catholics) and other religions (4%).”
Uruguay, perhaps the most secular
country in Latin America, has the
highest rates of religious indifference
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in the region. Unaffiliated believers
account for 23.2% of the population
and atheists and agnostics 17.2%.
Uruguay has the lowest percentage of
Catholics (47.1%) of any country in
the Southern Cone. 11% of
Uruguayans identify themselves as
Evangelical and a little more than
2% as belonging to other religions.
In a study that combines census
figures and ethnographic research,
Mexican researchers using data from
the National Institute of Geography
and Statistics (INEGI) analyzed the
complex world of religious identity
in their country. Renée de la Torre
and Cristina Gutiérrez Zúñiga
found the “territories of religious
diversity” in Mexico today to
include 88.9% Catholics, a little
more than 5% Evangelicals, 2.5%
“non-Evangelical Biblical religions”
and 3.52% no religion. “The dissidence is composed of a diversity of
religious minorities, internally very
disparate, where we find both firmly
consolidated religions and a pulverization of religious offerings.”
The results of Argentina’s First
Academic Poll of Religious Beliefs,
carried out in 2008, also reflect the
strong inroads made by Christian
religions other than Catholicism.
Argentina is still Catholic majority,
but other denominations have
expanded and diversified: 76.5% of
respondents identified themselves as
Catholic, 9% as Evangelical and
11% as indifferent (in other words,
atheists, agnostics and no religious
affiliation). The rest were divided
between Jehovah’s Witnesses (1.2%),
Mormons (0.9%) and other religions
(1.1%), among them Judaism, Islam,
Umbanda or other African-inspired
religions, Buddhism and Spiritism.
One noteworthy finding is that more
Argentines have no religion or religious education (11.2%) than are
Pentecostal (10.4%).
If we focus on the religion with
the most followers in Argentina,

Catholicism, we find that three-quarters of Catholics practice their beliefs
without the Church as an intermediary (65% practice their religion on
their own and 10% never do).
Among Evangelicals, in contrast, the
split is more even: 55.8% connect
with God through their church while
42.4% say they do so on their own.
As we have seen, Christianity, the
overwhelmingly majority religion on
the continent, is undergoing a profound transformation. On the one
hand, the Catholic Church (which
has difficulty maintaining a dialogue
with emerging sects, obsessed as it is
with the topic of sex and tangled up
in its own dogmas and bureaucratic
authority) is losing its hegemony to
countless and diverse religious groups
that “negotiate” their public presence, foremost among them the
powerful and vital Evangelical movement. On the other hand, we are
witnessing an “emotionalization” of
beliefs that cuts across Christian
groups that prioritize organization,
authority and emotional community
over dogma. Faith healing, speaking
in tongues, ecstatic dancing, entering
into trances, creating a climate of
human warmth and seeking a direct
connection to the sacred with no or
little institutional mediation, along
with “hyper-modern” use of the mass
communications media and links to
more “pragmatic” sources of financing are a part of both the
Charismatic Catholic Renewal movement and the many different
Pentecostal Evangelical groups.
In response to this religious
nomadism, however, communitarian
Catholic and Evangelical groups have
emerged that offer certainty, security
and totality to small groups, with the
goal of achieving long-term continuity. Among Catholics, groups like
the Legionaries of Christ, Institute of
the Incarnate Word, Knights of
Christ the King, New Catechumenate, etc. and, among Evangelicals,
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the Assemblies of God, God Is Love,
Universal Church of the Kingdom of
God and others create their own
authorities, legitimacies, memories
and relationships. The Catholic
groups are in a state of permanent
tension with local ecclesiastical
authorities and have varied links to
Rome. The Evangelical groups can be
likened to small salvation businesses
that act as micro-enterprises, with
local inputs and legitimacy limited to
their leader and congregation. The
network structure makes these groups
permeable but complicates the formation of shared national or regional
policies. Ultimately, individualization
and communitarianism are part of
the same social and cultural process.
Long-term studies should keep in
mind that Christian institutions maintain historical relations with the state,
culture and society through negotiations and by the power they accumulated in each nation state.
Christianity—especially Catholicism
—is a social space, not just an institutional one, with strong roots in Latin
American society that go beyond the
number of churches or clergy. A common and differentiated universe of
belief feeds “diffuse Catholic imaginaries” that compete with other imaginaries in the current context of globalized
communications, but that endure as
symbolic capital always ready and
available for use by different religious
actors and constituting “natural continuity” in a “long Catholic tradition.”
It is these different Catholic imaginaries that have been at stake in Latin
America since the end of the Cold
War, the triumph of the market and
US global hegemony: a Catholicism
based on certainties, another on emotions and a third on asceticism. Once
more the question is whether to conciliate or confront “liberalism,” US
imperial policy, modern values,
hedonism and individualism, and
whether the effort should be based at
the level of the dominant or popular

sectors, the institution and/or society.
While many Christian groups and
movements join in criticism of
unbridled market economics and the
external debt, other issues, among
them complicity with power,
imposed dogma, and opposition to
state-mandated reproductive health
and sex education create strong divisions both within Catholic groups
and between the Church and important segments of society.
The weakening of the social state
and the privatization of public policy
has created new spaces for religious
groups, especially those with a strong
institutional presence. One example
is the increased role of religious
groups in public education and social
assistance. As a result, neither the
state nor political parties can claim
hegemony over popular spaces;
instead, an assortment of religious
groups enjoy so much legitimacy in
this sphere that the state and party
leaders are compelled to consult them
and invite their participation in
social, educational, cultural and
employment-related activities.
In addition, the loss of credibility
of government and party promises
and mediation in the redefinition of
the public and private spheres (an
effort in which the women’s movement has played a central role) has
opened a whole new range of spaces
for religious leaders and their agendas. This explains the increasingly frequent appearance of priests, pastors,
rabbis, imams and other religious
leaders in mediating or managing
social conflicts. They have more credibility as social actors than as “representatives of the sacred” or for their
moral or religious recommendations,
and they have the ability to claim
greater institutional power.
Religious institutions do not consider themselves to be on the margins
of political power, nor do state officials think of themselves as apart
from religion. We have seen the

emergence of a political-religious
sphere characterized by a back and
forth flow that merits more transparency and analysis. Legal equality
among all religious groups (or the
effort to gain the same privileges as
those enjoyed by Catholicism), as
well as the quest for equality, justice
and inclusion for all men and
women, may represent a potential
source of conflict among religions.
In conclusion, we must remember
that in Latin America historically the
great majority of believers have not
been active members or daily participants in any religious group. Latin
America does not have the same tradition of mass parochial culture that
characterized Europe for many centuries. These are not “apathetic” or
“passive” men and women who are
“objects of manipulation” by their
churches. Their religious beliefs
influence their daily lives and provide
answers to important challenges at
the level of identity, belonging, family structure, etc. In situations of generalized anxiety or uncertainty, religious ethics are one of the main
sources of meaning. The panorama
of experiences ranges from believing
without belonging to religious individualism. By affirming the primacy
of emotional experience, Pentecostal
groups—whether Catholic or
Evangelical—do not respect, or simply reject, the imposition of religious
authority through institutional symbolic violence. n
Fortunato Mallimaci is a professor at
the Universidad de Buenos Aires and
a senior researcher at CONICET
(Argentina’s National Council of
Scientific and Technical Research).
1

Concept introduced by Zygmunt Bauman,
referring to the privatization of ambivalence
and increasing feelings of uncertainty, a kind
of chaotic continuation of modernity.
(Editor’s note)
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Indigenous Pentecostalism
in Latin America: Argentina’s
Chaco Region
By Pablo Wright; Translated by Alisa Newman
he Protestant expansion
in Latin America, which
has progressed at a varying pace across the
region in the last century, marks a new chapter in societies
whose socio-religious structures were
shaped historically by Catholicism.
Even in the colonial period, however,
when Catholicism was imposed on
indigenous groups as the hegemonic
faith of the Spanish conquerors, it
gave rise to countless cultural recreations blending ancestral languages,
rituals and sacred images with those
of the European Christian world.
These re-elaborated religious and ritual forms were the context for the
arrival of Protestantism, extending
mostly from two geopolitical powers,
the United States and England.
Of all the varieties of Protestantism, Pentecostalism has had the
strongest impact on indigenous societies, thanks to two interrelated factors. First, certain characteristics of
Pentecostalism, which emphasizes
the “gifts of the Holy Spirit,” such as
speaking in tongues and faith healing, as well as ritual forms of the
manifestation of divine power—its
cosmological and ritual aspect, its
universe of practices and representations—find an echo in indigenous
traditions. Second, in the majority
of Catholic countries, Catholicism
has been associated historically with
the state, political power and the
ruling elite, which for many indige-
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nous groups are synonymous with
cultural, economic and political
oppression. The combination of
these two factors, in varying degrees
according to region and ethnic
group, favored acceptance of the
Pentecostal message as an interesting
and liberating cultural, ritual and
organizational synthesis with counter-hegemonic potential.
One example of this trend is the
spread of Pentecostalism among
indigenous groups in Argentina’s
Chaco region. Pioneering fieldwork
by Elmer Miller, Edgardo Cordeu
and Sandra Siffredi shows the same
factors at work as those cited above.
A similar story seems to have been
repeated among other groups in
Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Mexico.
All demonstrate complex, non-linear
cultural recreations in which traditional mythic and historical elements
combine with Pentecostal interpretations of Biblical mythology.
Among the Qom or Tobas people
in the Argentine Chaco, we see the
encounter between native shamanism and US Pentecostalism. The
former is based on powerful beings
on earth, underground and in the
heavens who are the “lords” of plant
or animal forms; an emphasis on
dreams as points of contact with the
numinous; and the social prestige of
both male and female shamans. In
the context of these practices and
representations, the Tobas were
impressed by the Pentecostal reli-

gious expressions they witnessed at
missionary camps targeting mostly
the area’s mestizo population and
went on to recreate Pentecostalism in
their own way. Today, the dominant
religious form is the so-called
Gospel, the native synthesis of this
encounter between religions practiced by Toba churches scattered
throughout the Chaco region. Each
church has a committee of pastors,
deacons, secretaries, etc., who act as
local power councils. Religious services have the same structure as conventional Pentecostalism but with
elements of Shamanism, especially in
the therapeutic techniques practiced
during the phase of the service
known as “healing.” Finally, in the
shamanic-Pentecostal amalgam of
religious representation we have an
example of highly creative symbolic
recreation. The Christian deity is
inserted in the most powerful position of the Toba pantheon, along
with Jesus and the Bible; the traditional “lords” have been relegated to
secondary positions and generally, as
was the case during the Spanish spiritual conquest, characterized by their
demonic nature as representations of
evil on earth.
The Toba Gospel is as much of a
social system as a religious one, and
the only way to understand it is as a
product of modern Latin American
history. This is clear in the responses
of Toba church members in studies
of the region; when asked by ethnog-
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raphers why they converted to the
Gospel a common answer is that
Catholicism is a “white” religion—
one practiced by non-indigenous
social groups—and that they are now
better off in terms of health and economically. In other words,
Pentecostalism allows indigenous
groups to become more visible and
legitimate citizens despite the incomprehension of “whites,” in whose eyes
Protestant Indians seem somehow
“less Argentine.”
The Toba Gospel, since its beginnings in the mid 1950s, has undergone many transformations, crises,
schisms and confrontations both
within its ranks and with the political system, but it represents the most
powerful and dynamic socio-cultural
and religious condensation of its
type to date. As in all social transformations, its members are the ever
more visible protagonists of their
own history. n
Pablo Wright is a researcher with
Argentina’s National Scientific and
Technological Research Council
(CONICET) and affiliated with the
Universidad de Buenos Aires.

LACC Haitian Summer Institute 2010
The Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida
International University will hold its 13th Annual Haitian Summer
Institute in 2010.
The thematic focus of the institute is: “Haiti, Language, Culture and
Society.” The institute features intensive Haitian Creole language
training at the beginning, intermediate and advanced levels, as well
as an interdisciplinary lecture series in Haitian Studies.
The institute takes advantage of Florida International University’s
location in Miami, home to a vibrant Haitian community and
participants benefit from daily contact with native speakers of
Haitian Creole.
The institute is designed for students already enrolled in an academic
program, for school teachers who want to increase their knowledge of
Haiti and the Haitian community and for those in the general public
who desire a deeper understanding of the social, historical and political development of Haitian society and language. The institute is
open to degree and non-degree seeking students and credit hours
may count towards teacher recertification.
Tentative Dates: June 23 - August 7, 2010
Credits:

6 credits

Courses:

HAI 3213 Accelerated Beginning Haitian Creole
HAI 3214 Accelerated Intermediate-Advanced
Haitian Creole

Housing:

Housing is available on-campus
for an additional cost.
Students may also arrange off-campus housing.

Tuition Cost:

$1,200.00 (approximate)

The Haitian Summer Institute is co-sponsored by the Center for
Latin American Studies at the University of Florida.
For more information:
LACC Academic Programs
305-348-2894
lacc@fiu.edu
http://lacc.fiu.edu
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New World African Religion:
Twenty-First Century Crossroads
By Terry Rey
frican religions not
only survived the
transatlantic slave trade
but have flourished so
robustly that today in
Brazil electoral candidates court the
sanction of priestesses of
Candomblé, an African-derived
religion that counts millions of
adherents. Its largest sibling religions, Cuban Santería and Haitian
Vodou, meanwhile, have likewise
overcome a whole range of racist,
political, and economic obstacles
and today enjoy unprecedented visibility and acceptance, not to mention more followers than ever. In
part because of these obstacles,
membership in New World African
religions in Latin America and the
Caribbean is notoriously difficult to
gauge, but most careful observers
would agree that from Rio to
Miami there are clear signs of
growth and/or stability overall. In
addition to the beauty and power
that has always drawn followers to
these religions, they will continue
to be shaped in part by their relationship to church and state.
Colonial slave states of course prohibited their practice, a suppressive
juridical reality that did not change
much with independence and
would only recede, variously, during the last quarter of the twentieth
century. In light of this newfound
freedom from state persecution,
one would expect these religions to
continue to grow in the twenty-first
century. Some, indeed, will, while
others are beginning to decline.

A
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Let’s take the case of Haitian
Vodou, for example. The most reliable demographic statistics indicate
that between 1982 and 1997 the
number of Protestants in Haiti had
doubled to roughly one-third of the
total national population, leading
two leading Haitian sociologists to
assert that “Haiti is on pace to
becoming a country of a Protestant
majority” (Houtart and Rémy 1997:
34-35)! Moreover, because throughout Haiti “the mixture of sèvis lwa
[Vodou] with Protestantism is rare”
(Woodson and Baro 1996: 54), it is
likely that at least one in three people
in Haiti today does not practice
Vodou; if we add to them the number of fran katolik (lit: frank
Catholics; i.e., Catholics who do not
also practice Vodou), it would appear
that presently Vodouists in Haiti,
who are themselves mostly also
Catholic, constitute a slight but
declining majority of the population.
And whereas President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide’s granting of legal status to
Vodouist marriages in 2003 lends
new legitimacy to the religion, this
has done little, if anything, to stem
the outward flux of apostates.
By contrast, Candomblé has continued to demonstrate remarkable
growth and to develop an increasingly public national standing in Brazil.
One scholar (Johnson 2002: 157)
speaks of this as a “Widening
Semiotic Community,” which in
recent decades has featured, among
other impressive public displays: a
period of national mourning for a
priestess in 1986, “a loss not just for

Afro-Brazilian religious adepts but
rather for society,” which was followed
several years later by a centennial celebration of her birth in the city of
Salvador, “presided over by the mayor
and the governor”; the appearance
since the 1990s of “literally hundreds
of thousands” of Brazilians along the
beaches of Rio each New Year’s Eve
to venerate Yemaya, Candomblé’s
feminine orixa (spirit) of the sea; and,
the use by Brazil’s national airline,
Varig, of the slogan “Fly with Axé,” or
with the divine life force that is central to the religion’s theology and
ontology alike.
This is not to suggest, however,
that Candomblé and related traditions are being given free reign over
Brazil’s religious field. On the contrary, Brazil, like Haiti and, to a lesser extent Cuba, remains a predominately Christian nation, and
Christian churches are finding new
ways to compete in an increasingly
competitive religious marketplace
(Chesnut 2003). Although lacking
the state sanction and the related
assistance of military and police
forces that the Catholic Church
enjoyed for years in its persecution of
African-derived religions, Evangelical
churches have taken to the task in
recent decades with equal zeal. For
one of the most glaring examples,
Vodouists traditionally have flocked
to Bois Caïman, a few hours north
of Port-Prince, each August 14/15 to
commemorate the 1791 Vodou ceremony there that—as national
mythology has it—sparked the
Haitian Revolution; this tradition
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Hundreds of followers and devotees of Cuba’s patron saint La Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre take part in a procession during celebrations in Havana.
Photo: Adalberto Roque/AFP/Getty Images.

has in recent years been impeded by
overwhelming throngs of
Evangelicals seeking to exorcise Bois
Caïman—and, by extension,
Haiti—and preaching that Vodou is
satanic. The Evangelical assault in
Latin America is also aimed at the
Catholic Church, furthermore,
which was quite shockingly illustrated in 1995 by Reverend Sérgio Von
Helder’s kicking and punching an
icon of Nossa Senhora da Imaculada
Conceição Aparecida, Brazil’s patron
saint, on a televised broadcast. Not
to be outdone, outraged protesters,
Catholics and Candomblistas alike,
burned the televangelist in effigy.
Cuban Santería faces similar, if less
dramatic, challenges from
Christianity, though its recent history is distinguished from that of
either Candomblé or Vodou by its
ambiguous relationship to the
Castro regime. On the one hand,
the communist regime has effective-

ly promoted atheism and thereby
curtailed public religious life on the
island in general; on the other hand,
it has long acknowledged Santería’s
place in Cuban national identity
(Brandon 1997: 101), and Fidel
Castro himself is widely believed to
be a practicing Santero.
Furthermore, the Castro government has demonstrated surprising
(for communists) entrepreneurial
acumen in exploiting the religion’s
growing popularity at home and
abroad by monopolizing the open
sale of Afro-Cuban ritual paraphernalia and by selling visas to foreigners drawn to Cuba’s burgeoning religious tourist trade, which is affectionately known as “Santurismo”!
Gone are the days—thankfully
and hopefully forever—when adherents of African-derived religions in
the Americas had to practice their
faith in secrecy and/or in fear of
legal and social reprisals. Though

still facing stiff competition in the
ever-diversifying religious markets of
Latin America, New World African
religions have grown remarkably in
recent decades and taken their rightful place, a central one at that, in the
mosaics that make up cultural identity in many parts of the region, and
not just for people’s of African
descent. For, the Latin American
story is in significant part an African
story, one that is told with unsurpassed beauty in the drumming and
dancing of the Vodou temple, the
Candomblé terreiro, and the Cuban
casa de santo, and in the depth of
meaning and power that these religions bring to people’s lives. n
Terry Rey is a professor in the
Department of Religion at Temple
University. Dr. Rey specializes in the
anthropology and history of African
and African diasporic religions.
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Transformations in Latin
American Judaism
By Damián Setton; Translated by Alisa Newman
atin American Judaism
has experienced a series of
transformations since the
1980s that have significantly altered its makeup
and given rise to new social actors
and conflicts.
As in other parts of the world,
Judaism in Latin America in the
early twentieth century was built on
a foundation of secular matrixes that
reflected Jewish aspirations to
become part of the nation, with the
religious dimension relegated to the
background. It is this religious
dimension, however, that came to
monopolize the attention of both
Jewish communities and social scientists by the early 1980s.
Again, as in other parts of the
world, Latin American Judaism is
currently experiencing a revitalization
of Orthodox sentiments. Many Jews
are practicing what in Hebrew is
known as teshuva, a word that can
be translated as “return,” and which
in sociological terms implies a
process of religious conversion.
Typically, Jews socialized in nonOrthodox environments adopt
lifestyles emphasizing strict observance of Jewish law. This trend
reflects the transformation of the
dynamic between religion and
modernity that has affected other
religions, including Christianity,
Islam and “Oriental” religions.
Some scholars, among them Susana
Brauner and Renato Ortiz, have
argued that the gap left by Zionism
as a factor in Jewish identity has
been filled by religious movements

L
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at the same time that the process of
globalization and the consequent
weakening of national referents have
opened a space for the construction
of transnational identities. While
Conservative Judaism tried to create

a movement that could express the
national realities of different countries, as Leonardo Senkman notes,
Orthodox congregations have little
use for national considerations in the
construction of their identities. In

The Mikve Israel Synagogue on the Dutch island of Curaçao is the oldest Jewish house of worship
still in use in the Americas.
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Argentina, for example, followers of
the Chabad Lubavitch movement
identify themselves as Lubavitchers,
not as Argentine Jews. In definitions
of identity, the transnational community takes pride of place over the
national. This doesn’t mean, however, that we should ignore local particularities when analyzing the teshuva
movement in its different contexts.
The Chabad movement has altered
the physiognomy of Latin American
Judaism through its practice of sending emissaries to countries where
Orthodox Judaism lacks a strong
presence. Their goal is to create
spaces for socialization that have a
markedly Orthodox stamp. Other
baalei teshuva (returnees) look for
cities that offer the type of community infrastructure that was not available in their countries of origin; for
example, many Uruguayan baalei
teshuva emigrate to other countries
because Uruguay does not have the
infrastructure they need to practice
their desired lifestyle.
Several factors are important to
consider when discussing these
trends, above all the political transformations involved in Jews’ emergence into the public arena. In
Argentina, the return to democracy
in 1983 opened spaces for the
expression of different religions.
Argentine society stopped thinking
of itself as a monolithic whole and
began to recognize and legitimate its
own plurality. And in Mexico, the
end of the PRI’s monopoly over politics brought to power the National
Action Party (PAN), whose tradition
of conservative Catholicism lent new
legitimacy to religion in public life.
Another trend developing on the
fringes of Orthodoxy is the emergence of a heterogeneous collective
that defines itself as “pluralistic
Judaism” and comprises such sectors
such as the Meretz party, the ICUF
(Federation of Yiddish Cultures),
Conservative rabbis and various

intellectuals. The Pole for Pluralistic
Judaism, which was created in
Argentina in 2008, defines Judaism
from a perspective that acknowledges
the many different ways of being a
Jew and the individualization of definitions of identity.
Finally, for many Jews, Judaism
itself is an arena for free circulation
and fluid borders. They construct
their own Jewishness from a patchwork of different influences without
affiliating themselves with any single
one. They build their own Judaism
out of multiple sources of meaning
that incorporate diverse Jewish and
non-Jewish influences and, within
Judaism itself, different religious
expressions.

As a result, we are witnessing a
moment when two apparently conflicting trends are intensifying simultaneously: on the one hand, the creation of communities with welldefined borders, and on the other,
individuals for whom these borders
do not represent an insurmountable
barrier. Orthodox Judaism benefits
from both of these movements. n
Damián Setton is a researcher at the
Center for Labor Research and Studies
and the Program in Economic
Research on Technology, Labor and
Employment (CEIL-PIETTE) at the
National Council for Scientific and
Technical Research (CONICET) in
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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Islam in Latin America
By María del Mar Logroño Narbona

slam is one of the world religions practiced in Latin
America today. Since the late
1950s mosques are part of
the urban and religious landscape of cities like Sao Paulo,
Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Bogota
among others. While statistics are
contradictory and its history is controversial, Islam is nonetheless part
of the social and cultural reality of
most Latin American countries.
Today Latin Americans of Muslim
descent and converts alike practice
Sunni or Shiite Islam, along with
other more or less controversial
forms such as Sufism.

I

Contradicting Statistics
Despite an increasing presence of
Islam, to this date there are no trustworthy statistics that convey the
exact number of Muslims in any
Latin American country. Lack of reliable official censuses and discrepancy
in the available data are among the
problems that scholars face when
analyzing this phenomenon. For
instance, as scholars of Islam in
Brazil have explained, “[t]here is an
enormous discrepancy between the
data about Muslims gathered by the
official census and the numbers presented by Muslim entities.”(1) If the
official census indicated the existence
of 27, 239 Muslims in Brazil in the
year 2000, Muslim institutions claim
the existence of up to one million
Muslims in the same Brazilian territory. Scholars of Islam in Argentina
face a similar challenge, with estimates ranging from 900,000 in the
country to as low as 4,500 in Buenos
Aires, the city with probably the
largest number of Muslims. (2)
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According to scholars of Islam in
non-Muslim countries, the main
issues behind statistical discrepancies lie both in the parameters as
well as in the tools used to identify
Muslim identity. Can we define
only as Muslim the person who
attends the Friday prayer at the
mosque as prescribed in Islam? Do
Muslims self-identify themselves as
Muslims when asked in a survey?
While the first question begs for
comparison with similar problems
faced by scholars of other religions,
the second question needs to consider how Muslims have historically
been subject of high profiling after
the events of the Iranian Revolution

of 1979, and more recently of
September 11, 2001.
A Controversial History
The historical presence of Islam
in Latin America is also a controversial subject. There is no agreement among historians as to when
exactly date the origins of Islam in
Latin America. Some Muslim
scholars often date the presence of
Islam to colonial times, whereas
others have questioned this
approach, since the presence of
moriscos and Jews was banned by
the colonial authorities.
Although academic research on
this subject is starting to question

A group of Muslims pray at the Al Imam Ali Eben Abi Taleb Mosque in the city of Curitiba in
southern Brazil.
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the success of this prohibition,
most scholars have traditionally
agreed that the presence of Islam in
Latin America can be traced back
first to the presence of African
Muslim slaves in Brazil since the
late eighteenth century; the introduction of indentured labor in the
Caribbean starting in the nineteenth century; and finally the
waves of Arab Muslim migration to
Latin America since the final
decades of the nineteenth century.
Islam in Latin America Today
Of these three trends explained
by historians, only African Islam in
Brazil seems to have left no trace in
today's Brazilian Muslim community. On the contrary, indentured
labor in the Caribbean and longterm migration from Muslim
Middle Eastern countries are
among the processes that have led
to the development of Islam in
Latin America. Along with them,
conversion is the third way by
means of which Islam is increasing
its presence in the continent. To
this day, conversion does not seem
to represent a significant demographic trend within Latin
American societies. It is nonetheless
an interesting phenomenon that
can be explained by two different
factors: on the one hand, conversion is the result of efforts from
within existing Muslim communities who, funded mostly by the
Iranian and Saudi Arabian governments, expand their social activities
and networks attracting followers;
on the other hand, events like the
Iranian revolution and September
11 have sparked interest in Islam
among Latin Americans in search
of religious fulfillment.
Islam in all its diversity is today
present both in the urban landscape
and the public sphere. Along with
the construction of Shiite and
Sunni mosques, smaller prayer halls

and associations mark the spaces of
Islam in large and small cities of
Latin America. Likewise, Islam
shares some of the radio waves in
cities like Buenos Aires. The ubiquity and interconnectedness of
internet, however, has turned the
cyberspace into the preferred medium among Latin American
Muslims who, in their Spanish,
Portuguese and English speaking
websites provide support to this
growing community. n

María del Mar Logroño Narbona is
an assistant professor of modern
Middle Eastern history at FIU. She is
currently leading a project on Islam
in Latin America through the
University's Latin American and
Caribbean Center, funded by the
Social Science Research Council.

“Islam in Latin America”
LACC Wins Grant to Improve Public Knowledge on Islam and
Muslim Communities in Latin America. The project aims to:
• Support research on the increasing presence of Muslims in
Latin America, a result of both conversion and migration
• Develop scholarship on Islam as a public resource
• Facilitate scholarly engage with policymakers and journalists
and create new channels for the distribution of high-quality
expert knowledge so that it might directly inform journalism,
policy, and public discourse
• Revitalize the public mission of universities by addressing
topics of critical importance to ongoing national debates
and policy
• Communicate the diversity of Islamic civilizations and Muslim
communities and bring attention to regions and issues that
have been largely neglected in public discourse

Funded by The Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
For more information contact LACC at 305-348-2894
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